Lees hier het pdf van dit artikel. Statistieken, cijfers en getallen stralen een zekere mate van autoriteit en zekerheid uit. Als een bewering gestaafd is met een cijfer, dan moet het toch wel waar zijn, toch? Hoe werken, of juist niet, getallen voor onze menselijke geest? Logicus Johan van Benthem over het redeneren met getallen. Door Johan van Benthem Getallen zien we overal. Wetenschappelijke tijdschriften staan er vol mee, maar net zo goed de kranten. Wat mijzelf als logicus al jaren fascineert is niet een monopolie van getallen als hoeder van exactheid, maar wel de rol die zij spelen in het rijke cognitieve geheel van menselijk redeneren en communiceren. Daarbij zijn het niet zozeer getallen in de wetenschap die tot nadenken stemmen, maar juist de invloed van getallen in het dagelijks leven en de maatschappij, bijvoorbeeld geld en belastinggegevens. In dit essay buig ik mij over de voors en tegens van ons menselijk vertrouwen op getallen. Wat doen ze voor ons, en wat niet – en hoe houden we ze in het gareel? Abstracte schoonheid Het zal duidelijk zijn waarom getallen zo aantrekkelijk zijn. Ze vatten kort samen, ze scheppen precisie, ze maken iets voor snelle overzichtelijke wiskundige berekening vatbaar, en we krijgen er automatisch een machtige bondgenoot bijgeleverd, namelijk de wetenschap. En dat laatste verschaft kwantitatief denken ook haar prestige: getallen hebben een geschiedenis van succes, en ze leven ook nog eens in een wereld van abstracte schoonheid. Is het niet prachtig om ineens te beseffen dat uw telefoongesprekje over ditjes en datjes berust op signaaloverdracht volgens eeuwig ware wiskundige formules? Zijn harde exacte getallen het hoogste goed, en de ultieme toets van redelijk denken en handelen? Je zou het haast denken nu we weer de mystieke hoogmis zijn ingegaan van het doorrekenen van verkiezingsprogramma’s door het Centraal Planbureau. Ook beroemde filosofen preekten de suprematie van getallen. Rudolf Carnap onderscheidde drie historische stadia in het menselijk denken. Het eerste is subjectief en contextgebonden, zoals wanneer ik zeg dat het warm is. ‘Warm’ of ‘koud’ zijn persoonlijke kwalificaties die ik aan een situatie toeken. Meer objectief is het vergelijkende stadium, waarin we een object warmer of kouder noemen dan een ander. U en ik kunnen het erover eens zijn dat Nederland warmer is dan IJsland, zonder het eens te zijn over de vraag of Nederland warm is. Het derde en hoogste stadium is bij Carnap kwantitatief: we kunnen aan objecten een temperatuur toekennen, en dat getal is objectief, er valt niet meer over te twisten. Er is ook mee te rekenen, en we raken verbonden met een fonds aan kennis, de wetten die het gedrag van temperatuur en andere natuurkundige grootheden beheersen. Exactheid zonder getallen Binnen de wetenschap zijn getallen onomstreden gemeengoed. Maar het omgekeerde volgt niet. Niet elke exacte discipline gebruikt getallen. Grote delen van de wiskunde, logica, en informatica gaan over niet-numerieke meetkundige of symbolische structuren waarover even exact kan worden geredeneerd als met getallen. Dus een niet-kwantitatieve redenering is niet bij voorbaat verdacht. Dat is bijvoorbeeld te zien in de speltheorie, een tak van de wiskunde die beslissingen analyseert gebaseerd op redeneren over gedrag van anderen. Stel: u heeft een aardig idee dat op zich nog niet goed genoeg is voor publicatie, maar samen met mijn expertise lukt het zeker om een mooi gezamenlijk artikel te schrijven. Maar zodra u mij uw idee vertelt, kan ik het ook alleen publiceren. U besluit uw idee voor u te houden. Is dat rationeel? Desgevraagd zou u kunnen zeggen dat u het waarschijnlijker acht dat ik voor eigen roem zou gaan dan dat ik zou samenwerken. Dus neemt u maar genoegen met de kleine stille vreugde van een ongepubliceerd goed idee, en ik krijg niets. Dat is een prima speltheoretische redenering, u speelt zelfs het enige strategische evenwicht van dit spel – het zogenoemde Nash-evenwicht. Maar dat evenwicht berust slechts op een kwalitatieve vergelijking van mogelijk gedrag en voorkeuren tussen situaties, er hoeft geen getal aan te pas te komen. Hetzelfde geldt voor vele andere sociale situaties: precisie heeft vele verschijningsvormen. Voor de goede orde haast ik mij twee kanttekeningen toe te voegen. Om te beginnen werkt speltheorie ook als u meer weet over numerieke nutswaarden voor de spelers, of waarschijnlijkheden van hun gedrag. Het is dus niet zo dat getallen misplaatst zijn, alleen dat ze geen noodzakelijke voorwaarde zijn voor precisie. Ook geef ik meteen toe dat het gegeven scenario vooronderstellingen maakt, bijvoorbeeld dat u niet weet of de ander een concurrent is of een coöperatief persoon – overigens tamelijk realistisch in veel werksituaties. Als die aannamen verschuiven kan de bovenstaande conclusie verschuiven. Maar die variabiliteit doet niets af aan de kwalitatieve aard van veel subtiel sociaal redeneren dat ons gedrag regelt. Er zijn vele andere voorbeelden te geven van precisie zonder getallen, maar ik hoop dat mijn voorbeeld voldoende ruimte heeft geschapen tussen deze twee noties. Tegen deze achtergrond wordt het interessant om de rol van getallen zelf eens nader te bekijken. Getallen met betekenis Getallen op zich zijn blind, en betekenen niets. Ik noem twee van de bekendste kwalificaties van de kwantiteit: getallen hebben een bijsluiter nodig, en een context. Om met de bijsluiter te beginnen: hoe betrouwbaar is de meting, wat is de foutenmarge? Vaak is een getal slechts een schatting binnen een zekere orde van grootte, moeten we marges weten: klopt de begroting tot op miljoenen, wat is de speling in de levensverwachting op termijn? Bijna elk getal in de krant heeft een halo van onzekerheid, en dat maakt praktische conclusies ingewikkeld. In feite waden wij in ons handelen door een zee van waarschijnlijkheid, en exacte getallen zijn schaars. Soms kan het zelfs informatiever, en eerlijker, zijn om terug te gaan naar Carnap’s eerste stadium, en gewoon te zeggen dat iets ‘veel’ geld gaat kosten of ‘heel veel’ geld. Lotfi Zadeh, de uitvinder van de fuzzy logic, wijst er graag op hoe verfijnd uitdrukkingen als ‘veel’ of ‘weinig’ in natuurlijke taal werken, en hij heeft er zelfs robots, liftdeuren, en andere zaken mee geprogrammeerd. Nog belangrijker is een tweede kwalificatie. Zelfs al waren getallen geheel exact, dan nog betekenen ze helemaal niets zonder context. ‘Meten is weten’ is een naïeve gedachte. Alleen maar feiten verzamelen en dan hopen dat het begrip vanzelf komt is een soort optimisme dat in de filosofie, maar ook in de wetenschap, weinig oplevert. Feiten krijgen betekenis als antwoord op een voorafgaande vraag die bepaalt wat er aan de orde is, en op het spel staat. Natuurlijk, soms vergapen we ons aan loutere feiten, zoals de toverlantaarn met kleurenplaatjes van hersenwerking in uw wetenschapsbijlage. Maar die plaatjes betekenen weinig tenzij er een vraag achterligt, en een idee over de achterliggende functie. Evenzo zegt verzamelen van talloze gegevens over het economisch functioneren van ons land niets, tenzij het in dienst staat van een kwestie, een beslissing of een visie. Menselijk redeneervermogen Het ligt dus allemaal niet zo eenvoudig met getallen. Zoals uit het bovenstaande blijkt is menselijke interpretatie nodig om getallen hun echte waarde te geven. Maar hoe goed zijn mensen eigenlijk in exact redeneren, met getallen of zonder? Deze vraag houdt de cognitiewetenschap al lang bezig, en er is nog lang geen consensus. Wat we weten is dat ons redeneren een complex samenspel is van processen in verschillende delen van het brein, die samenhangen met taal, visuele waarneming, kwalitatieve vergelijkingen, en rekenen met getallen. Sommige psychologen denken dat we niet erg goed zijn in redeneren, met name als het om waarschijnlijkheid gaat, en fouten worden soms met smaak opgedist als een ‘syllabus errorum’ van dwalingen. Ik zelf meen dat het erg meevalt met het redeneervermogen van gewone mensen, maar er is nog veel dat we niet weten over ons redeneren. Zo is er weinig bekend over de schematische voorstellingen die mensen maken van situaties alvorens daarmee te gaan rekenen of redeneren. Ook weten wij weinig over de rol die wordt gespeeld door ons geheugen, de opslag van onze eerdere ervaringen. Sommige onderzoekers menen dat het geheugen juist weer essentieel gebruik maakt van getallen. Overigens is de cognitiewetenschap wel eens te conservatief, alsof ons reken- en redeneervermogen een onveranderlijk natuurgegeven zou zijn. Maar jezelf verbeteren is ook een wezenlijk vermogen, inclusief steeds beter leren omgaan met feiten en getallen. Jezelf beter toerusten is vaak wel nodig, want statistieken maken iets essentieels zichtbaar dat onze persoonlijke ervaring overstijgt. Wij mensen vertoeven in een klein gebiedje van het universum, qua fysieke bewegingen, maar evenzeer van handelen in het algemeen. ‘Boven ons’ individuele gedrag liggen veel hogere aggregatieniveaus van publieke opinie, massagedrag, en evolutie op lange termijn, die vaak alleen statistisch zijn zichtbaar te maken en begrijpen. Het was onze raadpensionaris Johan de Witt die in de 17de eeuw in zijn boekje ‘Waerdye’ de grondslagen legde van de levensverzekeringswiskunde gekoppeld aan Hollandse sterftestatistieken, waardoor een belangrijk hoger domein van deze aard voor het eerst grijpbaar werd. De Witts statistiek en rekenen met waarschijnlijkheden zijn een voorbeeld van denken in de wereld van ‘grote kengetallen’ van massagedrag en dynamische systemen over lange tijdsduur. Dit rekenen met ‘grote getallen’ geeft een heel ander perspectief op onze sociale situatie dan de individuele rationaliteit van het alledaagse beslissen zoals wij die normaal ervaren en beoefenen. De resulterende botsing van twee op zich legitieme, maar vaak niet geheel met elkaar te rijmen redeneerwijzen, en ook twee perspectieven op onszelf, is een groot thema in de hedendaagse speltheorie en filosofie, met repercussies tot in de ethiek. Er is geen consensus in de wetenschap of de filosofie hoe we dit samenspel het best kunnen begrijpen. En als de geleerden dat al niet kunnen, dan zal de gewone burger het al helemaal niet makkelijk hebben als de verkiezingstijd nadert en de cijfers rondzoemen als wespen. Exactheid en cognitieve dynamiek Al het voorgaande wijst in dezelfde richting. Er is niet één beste denktrant, en getallen zijn absoluut niet de maat van alle dingen. In mijn eigen werk ben ik daarom geïnteresseerd in een meer dynamisch perspectief op omgaan met getallen. Een van de meest kenmerkende vermogens van mensen is het kunnen bezien van eenzelfde situatie op verschillende niveaus. Getallen kunnen daarbij een uiterst belangrijke rol spelen. Getallen dienen de precisering van ons kwalitatieve denken over het inrichten van ons leven, en tegelijk ook als reality check. Dat beheersen is belangrijk en nuttig, en interessant. Maar even belangrijk is een omgekeerd cognitief vermogen, dat gaat van meer naar minder formeel detail. Ik bedoel het in andere woorden kunnen beschrijven van een getalsmatige analyse, op hoofdlijnen en met de kerngedachten, vaak in gewone taal. Zelfs wiskundigen doen dat als ze ‘het essentiële idee’ van een bewijs uitleggen, en dit vermogen tot parafraseren geeft juist evidentie dat de spreker het bewijs of de berekening echt heeft begrepen en boven haar materie staat. Ik voeg hiermee nog een derde kwalificatie toe aan mijn eerdere twee van bijsluiter en context: getallen zijn pas overtuigend als ze zijn ingebed in een dynamiek van ‘parafrases’, verschillende beschrijvingswijzen, die heen en weer kunnen gaan tussen wiskundige getallen en onze gewone natuurlijke taal. En hiermee is meteen nog een andere dynamiek verweven, en wel die van discussie tussen meerdere personen, want herbeschrijving naar meer of naar minder detail vindt vaak plaats als vorm van communicatie, wanneer iemand anders vraagt om een nadere technische onderbouwing, of juist om een algemene pointe die leidt tot een breder begrip. En dus is de realiteit van de maatschappelijke interactie meteen ook de slijpsteen van de individuele geest. Kortom, zijn getallen belangrijk? Ja. Zijn ze bij voorbaat superieur aan andere manieren van denken en weten? Nee. Wat moet dan ons richtsnoer zijn? Het zal mij beroepshalve vergeven worden als ik denk dat dit reeds 2000 jaar geleden is geformuleerd door Aristoteles. Wat deze Griekse grondlegger van de logica zei was het volgende: ‘Het kenmerk van de ontwikkelde geest is om elk onderwerp die mate van exactheid te geven die het verdient – en niet meer.’   Johan van Benthem is universiteitshoogleraar logica aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam, Henry Waldgrave Stuart Professor of philosophy aan de Stanford-universiteit, en Distinguished International Expert aan de Tsinghuauniversiteit in Beijing.   Heeft dit artikel uw interesse gewekt? Klik hier voor meer info en abonnementen. – – Dit artikel verscheen in idee nr. 5 2012: Meten is weten, en is te vinden bij de onderwerpen psychologie en wetenschap.Lees hier het pdf van dit artikel. Door Pieter Derks The word ‘revolution’ has been suffering some severe devaluation in the past decades. That’s because of the ad-men. We have seen the word too often being combined with words like ‘shaving’ or ‘car-technology’. Buy our product, it’s a revolution in brushing your teeth! Sounds great. But once you buy it, turns out it’s still toothpaste, you still have to put it on a toothbrush, and the revolutionary part exists in little invisible ingredients that should have an effect on your breath, smile and/or the whiteness of your teeth, but seem to do so without you ever noticing the difference. No wonder people get skeptical when they hear politicians talk about revolution. But the ad-men keep using revolution as a way to sell things, because of one simple reason: it sells. We love the idea. The outcome isn’t even important; we just love it when things get turned upside down every once in a while. We love it so much, you can just put the word ‘change’ on a poster and get elected president of the United States of America. It’s like looking forward to a new house, or a new girlfriend: you think of all the things you’ll do better this time, the great chance this is to make a fresh start and build something from scratch just the way you like it. The only problem is we’re not that good in finishing revolutions. I moved three years ago, to a house that I knew for sure would be perfect and beautiful – but I still have to paint the bathroom door and unpack the last few boxes. I would be a very lousy revolutionary. If I would try to change a regime the way I changed my house, I would get rid of the old government with great enthusiasm, make a few easy changes that would not take too much of an effort, and then just leave things as they were, thinking: yeah, democracy, would be nice to have that working someday. But let’s have dinner first! I am exactly the kind of person the toothpaste-marketeers are after. And I guess most of us are. The French revolution, always the benchmark when it comes to revolutions, was a great way to get rid of the king and his cake-baking wife, but eventually led to chaos, Terror and Napoleon. Just because after the revolution most French were too lazy to take over control, and thought: well, why don’t we let that little guy try to govern. He has got a bit of a temper, but come on, a guy his size should not be able to get us in too much trouble. And besides, he seems to have a heart problem, given the way he keeps on feeling his chest with his right hand, so he probably won’t survive for too long anyway. If you look at it from that point of view, history is just a continuing series of failed revolutions. A revolution that leads to a steady and reliable government that succeeds in making everyone happy, thát would be a revolution in revolutions. Especially if it would refresh your breath at the same time. Let’s hope some marketeer will make it happen someday. For me, it’s just a little too much of an effort. Pieter Derks, is stand-up comedian and guest columnist for Idee. www.pieterderks.nl   Heeft dit artikel uw interesse gewekt? Klik hier voor meer info en abonnementen. – – Dit artikel verscheen in idee nr. 6 2012: Trust in people’s own power.Johan van Benthem Redeneren met getallen Dirk van Delft Meten = Weten > Welvaart Ton van Schaik Toekomstvoorspellingen van het CPB Thijs Kleinpaste Kleinpaste – Frankenstein Tom Louwerse Feitenvrije vs. meningenvrije politiek Maurits Hekking, Jan Murk en Pim de Kuijer Feiten en het politieke spel Feiten & cijfers Meten is weten Mark Sanders Meten maakt matig Cees Glas Meten met mate Kees Verhoeven Meten is zweten! Hilde Tjeerdema Ziek/Niet-ziek Sebastiaan ter Burg Gratis: heel veel gegevens Marijn Bosman D66 Debat – Beoordeling bestuurders Hille van der Kaa Meer data, meer transparantie Tim Rosendahl Boekrecensie – Weten is meer dan meten Daniel Boomsma Postbus66 – De intellectuele twijfel van John Stuart Mill Pieter Derks Meten tegen beter weten in Lees hier het pdf van dit artikel. Revolutions have the tendency to spread like a ‘virus’, inspiring people and affecting political systems in other countries. Will the one that started in Tunisia and spread via Egypt to Yemen, eventually lead to a revolution against undemocratic regimes in other parts of the world as well? Daniel George analyses this question with respect to Belarus. By Daniel George Any hopes that the ‘Revolution of Dignity’ in the Arab world would have positive implications for the democratic struggle in Belarus, have vanished quickly now the Belarusian regime is severely tightening its grip on the opposition and civil society for the last two years. The security insti-tutions have established a general feeling of fear and resignation. In the meantime, the state prop­aganda was very effective in displaying the nega­tive effects of the ongoing revolutions in the Arab world: civil-war, political chaos and economic hardships. In fact the Arab Spring has probably had a bigger impact on President Lukashenka himself than on the general population. In a re­cent interview he mourned Saddam Hussein and Muammar al-Gadhafi, in the same breath calling Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad ‘an absolute European, civilized man’.1 Hiding behind his ar­guments about the benefits of dictatorship and the illegitimacy of foreign intervention, it is ob-vious that the Belarusian President understands that his old strategy of swing-diplomacy between the European countries and Russia is not effective anymore. If we look closer, we can even see the paranoid Lukashenka, afraid that he might follow Gadhafi’s trail, sending out martial threats against his enemies. It is unlikely that the regime was prepared to finally break all ties with the European govern­ments when it decided to crack down on peaceful protesters that took to the streets against Lukashenka’s predictable victory in the presiden­tial elections on December 19, 2010. After a period of political and cultural relaxation from 2008, allowing a substantial development of capacity in civil society and even political opposition, the harsh actions during the election night and months following, basically destroyed all pro­gress that had been made. Even long-time observ­ers of the regime were surprised by the rigidity it employed against anyone who voiced only the slightest opposition against the prevailing sys­tem. Some stakeholders still hardly understand that the ‘policy of change through rapproche­ment’ is and was not applicable towards Lukashenka and his supporters. The events since 2010 clearly show that the hardliners within the regime are not open to any change or democratic improvement, especially if it would hurt their power- and business-interests. In this light their actions in the election night might have been an over-reaction, yet the Stalinist tendencies they employed thereafter are certainly a well-planned strategy. The economic crisis that hit Belarus in 2011 – including a tough devaluation of the Belarusian Rubel, the European sanctions and reluctance to reemploy political cooperation and a partial withdrawal of affection by the befriended Russian government contributed to the latest consolidation of the dictatorship. On the one hand Lukashenka is struggling to uphold the social contract with the Belarusian people while the economic crisis keeps threatening the stability of prices, wages and pensions. The year 2011 already saw a steep increase of food prices and further financial hard­ships, especially for workers and pensioners, the latter forming the biggest group of regime-support­ers. It should be reminded that the government’s pledge for stability was mostly underlined by the – compared to other eastern and south-eastern European countries – high living standards sup­plemented by cheap rates for utilities and gas, keeping the polls for Lukashenka at a stable high rate for years. On the other hand the autocrats tightening grip on civil society, reflecting long-gone times, is a reaction to the general public’s decreasing approval and the fear of civil unrest and the emergence of political alternatives. The additions introduced to the criminal code as a more or less direct reaction to the ‘Clapping Protest’ in the summer of 2011, now putting basically any public meeting under the threat of intensive punish­ment, are just one example of the government’s increasing paranoia. It is likely that this measure will be joined by a redefinition of ‘terrorism’ that includes political opposition and non-violent activities (‘the distribution of terrorist ideas and material’) against the state. A respective proposal appeared at first in June of this year and is cur­rently being processed by the powerless parlia­ment that is merely a public extension of the Belarusian Presidential Administration. Indeed the latest developments do not look very promis­ing, especially when taking into account that the Belarusian dictatorship has already proved to be very stable for more than twenty years, with only the most optimistic observers seeing a possibility for short-term change. The Western community drastically revised its policy after the events in 2010, cutting most of its direct political channels to the regime and burying the strategy based on the idea that change can be brought through co­operation. Still the intensified support of the Belarusian civil society has remained to a large extent ineffective under the increasing repres­sions of the security institutions. So what can be done to stimulate a Belarusian Spring? First of all it has to be clear that without intensified pressure from the Western commu­nity and especially the European Union, short-term change is not only unlikely: it’s impossible. It is a paradox when European governments give millions for the support of the Belarusian opposi­tion and civil society to get rid of the dictator­ship, while they are also protecting business interests that earn billions in more or less direct support for that same dictatorship. Only from January to August of 2012 Belarus exported 12.940.000 tons of solvents refined from Russian oil, including 5,8 million tons to the Netherlands and 1,83 million tons to Latvia, the two biggest customers in the European Union.2 In 2011, that’s after Lukashenka started his newest crusade against civil society, European trade with Belarus rose by 221%. In the first six months of 2012, the total trade of the eu with Belarus amounted to 8 billion Dollars.3 In a system where trade and specifically the business of solvents and other oil products is completely controlled by state authorities, it is clear that this cooperation is not supporting the Belarusian people but primarily bolsters the regime. Politicians in the European Union have to understand that the core of this regime is founded on business and profit. Thus there is no other option than tackling the con­glomerate of Belarusian state businesses and the oligarchs who arrange the external cooperation in a direct and decisive way. Unfortunately mem­ber states have not found agreement on tough economic sanctions in the past, with Latvia and Slovenia specifically showing interest in keeping several high-profile Belarusian companies off the blacklists. It is only a lackluster excuse to refer to possible hardships for the Belarusian people in this matter. Of course harder measures against the economical beneficiaries of the regime would speed up the disintegration of the Belarusian economy, but the prospect of the regime losing its capability to preserve the status quo is at least worth a try, if only for the sake of exactly those beneficiaries withdrawing their support for the dictator. Secondly, the European community, its national governments and independent donors and implementers have to increase the effectiveness of the support given to Belarusian civil society. This specifically demands a review and adjustment of funding policies and a better coordination be­tween the donors and implementers for more common efforts. This also needs approaches that are more focused on outcomes than quantity and an improved verification of program goals. Furthermore it is important to listen to the activ­ist on the ground and take local ownership for granted, but also to understand local realities by active observation rather than third-hand reports. Belarus is not Serbia or Tunisia and while basic ideas of building civil society might work, other proven concepts can become a complete failure. Donors and implementers already understood some mistakes of the past and for example now focus more on supporting local initiatives rather than on dubious partners who claim to have ac­tivists in every community across the nation. Specific attention should also be given to youth, students and women – focus groups that are more open to change than others. Last but not least international efforts should concentrate on an intensified support for independent media and initiatives that promote democratic change, eco­nomic reform and European integration through innovative projects that have the potential to turn the tide in the general public. The third and most problematic implication I would like to point out is the question of Russian influence. Democratic change in Belarus is gener­ally dependent on the political situation in Moscow. Although the relations between the two countries have cooled down during the last years, economical relations stay strong and the Russian government clearly regards Belarus as their zone of influence; one that should not diffuse towards the European Union. Some implementers in the past have sarcastically suggested that all support for democratisation in Belarus should be stopped and the money and effort to be invested in pro­moting democracy in Russia instead – the rest would then come without further efforts. Of course this is a blunt exaggeration, but it’s point­ing to the core problem that effects the whole re­gion (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine). Governments in the European Union should take a tougher stance on human rights abuses and the lack of democ­racy in Russia and also make clear through all possible channels that direct support for the preservation of a dictatorship on the border of the eu is in no way acceptable. At the same time an increased regional focus of donors and imple­menters that includes projects on cross-border cooperation for building civilsociety could pro­vide a base for using bestpractice and an intensi­fied development. In conclusion, it is very unlikely that we will see a drastic change for the better in the next couple of years. The keywords for the Western commu­nity, governments, donors and implementers should be ‘adjustment of policies’, ‘intensified cooperation’ and ‘speaking with one voice’. In the past Lukashenka always made very good use of disagreements and particular interests among his adversaries. If the Western community wants to actively promote change instead of waiting for a fortunate moment in history, the dictator and his supporters should not be allowed to be at least one step ahead at all times. The Belarusian Spring will need strong commitment and a long breath, but the struggle for a democratic and liberal soci­ety is worth the effort.   Daniel George is the programme manager of the Belarus Working Group of the International Federation of Liberal Youth (IFLRY). He is a member of the Aachen city council for FDP and treasurer of the Junge Liberalen branch in Aachen, Germany.   Notes 1 www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/whats-so-good-about-democracy-anyway-an-audience-with-the-last-dictator-in-europe-8218912.html; 19.10.2012 2 www.naviny.by/rubrics/economic/2012/10/19/ic_arti­cles_113_179619/; 19.10.2012 3 www.charter97.org/en/news/2012/10/23/60377/; 23.10.2012   Heeft dit artikel uw interesse gewekt? Klik hier voor meer info en abonnementen. – – Dit artikel verscheen in idee nr. 6 2012: Trust in people’s own power, en is te vinden bij de onderwerpen democratie en internationaal.Lees hier het pdf van dit artikel. Almost two years after the Arab Spring, it is time to take some distance and reflect on the outcomes of the movement. Today the popular uprising in Syria has become a full-fledged civil war with more than 30.000 fatalities. Islamist political groups won elections in Tunisia and Egypt and minority and women’s rights have been put under pressure. Can we actually speak of any positive changes in the Arab World? For those interested in the Middle East and the effects of the Arab Spring, they will find an ex­cellent read in The Battle for the Arab Spring, Revolutions, Counter-Revolutions and the Making of a New Era. By Boris van Westering What started as an single protest of one uni­que Tunisian individual, soon became a wide-scale revolution throughout the region. What did exactly happen, and where does the region stand now? The authors of The Battle for the Arab Spring Lin Noueihed and Alex Warren, combined extensive research, news articles, wikileaks, and have tapped first-hand material from their trips to the Arab region to answer these questions thoroughly. They succeed in providing the reader with a complete overview of the ‘cacophony of overlapping battles’ and provide a convincing context of the causes that unleashed the battle of the Arab Spring. Noueihed and Warren describe this battle as follows: ‘The battle for the Arab Spring is a battle for identity of a region buffeted through the past century by the rise and fall of European empires, by Cold War and by the encroachment of triumphant US superpower that aggressively pressed its interests. It is a battle for satisfying jobs, decent housing and the right of young people to grow up and build families and futures of their own. Most of all, it is a battle for dignity and justice after years of repression’. The book can be divided into three main parts. The first section, Roots of Rage, provides more historical context and digs into the question of why Arab countries did not develop into more open societies? Can it be explained by the resi­lience of the repressive regimes? Foreign influ­ences? Or is the society unprepared for democracy? It is not easy to pick and choose but a convincing argument can be detected in the combination of the increasing divide between the rich and the poor in combination with a very perverse form of elite corruption which seemed to be normal practice in most Arab countries. The authors describe that a combination of ‘economic hopelessness’ and ‘political powerlessness’ slowed the Arab po­pulation from claiming their dignity and calling for change, until that day in the small Tunisian city of Sidi Bouzid where the young street vendor Mohammad Bouazizi set himself on fire. This act of self-emulation eventually made him the martyr and symbol of the Tunisian Jasmine Revolution and of the Arab Spring in 2011. In the second section, Noueihed and Warren analyze the different revolutionary paths ta­ken by Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Libya, Yemen, and Syria. According to the co-authors these countries share similar patterns in their battle for the Arab Spring. Underlying factors of unemployment, corruption, and a democratic deficit led to social unrest and demonstrations, triggered by a small event. The reaction of the regime was often disproportional, employing extreme violence against the crowds. Bloody images were spread though social media and satellite television, which sparked new demon­strations. Not all revolutions were as successful as they were in Tunisia and Egypt. Foreign in­tervention prevented a long tribal conflict in Libya, and Syria is trapped in a military conflict with absolutely no room for a political solution. Interestingly, in the case of Bahrain where the Shia community saw an opportunity to claim more equal political rights and de­monstrate peacefully, the demonstrations were crushed and Saudi Arabia intervened, restoring order by sending its military troops and securing all strategic places. The foreign meddling of Saudi Arabia and its regional role in preventing the Arab Spring from affecting the kingdoms and emirates in the region is very well developed in the third and final section of The Battle of the Arab Spring. As the wealthiest country in the region and the birthplace of Islam, Saudi Arabia used its power and influence to protect other mo­narchies from the revolution. Noueihed and Warren write that Saudi Arabia supports ‘poli­tical forces emerging in the new-look republics that were not threatening to its own broader regional and international interests.’ The co-authors come to the conclusion that for the moment we cannot expect that the Arab Spring will affect the Arab monarchies and emirates. Noueihed and Warren are of the opinion that Western media are wrong to conclude that the Arab Spring turned into an Islamist winter. It is true that Islamist political groups like the Muslim Brotherhood gained power during the elections in Egypt, yet the authors warn us that ‘the notion that a win for the Islamist political parties necessarily equals a loss for democracy is false in the context of the Arab Spring’. There is a lot of diversity among the Islamists parties and therefore not all fall in the same category. As such the authors are convinced that in the end voters will choose their parties not because of their religious practice but rather of their success in the economic sphere. The challenges ahead for the newly elected leaders are huge, and it will take years or even decades before we can see real progress. They need to write new constitutions, create demo­cratic institutions and encourage democratic practices, safeguard the rights of minority groups. For many in the region, the foremost level of success will come in their capability to create jobs and create a better future for peo­ple in cities like Sidi Bouzid. According to the co-authors, Tunisia has the most favorable conditions to a successful transition to democracy. A message to the Western countries is to res­pect the local dynamic, learn from its implications, and not to try to offer blueprints for democracy. Noueihed and Warren are optimis­tic about the future as uncertain as it may be. The people of the region have learned that they can change their world and shape its future.   Boris van Westering is an independent Consultant / Project Manager specialised in international collaboration with the Middle East, related to education, journalism and human rights.   Heeft dit artikel uw interesse gewekt? Klik hier voor meer info en abonnementen. – – Dit artikel verscheen in idee nr. 6 2012: Trust in people’s own power, en is te vinden bij het onderwerp literatuur.Lees hier het pdf van dit artikel. Door Wouter Koolmees The Berlin Wall fell when I was 12 years old. Ahold ceo Anders Moberg lowered his bonus in 2003. And the Arab Spring was two years ago. Very different events, of course, but all good ex­amples of changes brought about because people came together and actively fought for common goals in society. Pure expressions of what I call ‘liberal citizenship’. Citizens who are independ­ent, but also feel a shared responsibility for the fate of others and for society as a whole. To me, this is a realisation of one of the pillars of D66: Trust in people’s own power. The Arab Spring shows that, however repressive a state might be, and how difficult problems might seem, if the group of individuals is large enough, their power is ultimately unstoppable. As a social-liberal I would like to enable people to actually take on their responsibility. Paul Schnabel, sociologist and Director of the Netherlands Institute for Social Research, often tells us about the state of affairs in the Netherlands. It turns out that people say: ‘I am doing fine, but we are doing badly.’ How is this possi­ble? Almost everyone thinks the government is not nearly doing enough to fulfil their needs. And the secret is: the government simply cannot accomplish this. Politicians should therefore state more often: ‘You yourself have abilities, capacities and possibilities!’ Look for example at the Brent Spar affair. The debate about the outdated Shell oil platform that needed to be demolished, finally resulted in companies trying to take more corpo­rate social responsibility. This is also liberal citi­zenship: rising up to the challenge, thinking through how things could be better and then real­ize those ideas. It is not the state that fixes things for us, but society itself that feels responsible. From here it is now only a small step to the thoughts of Robert Reich, former Minister of Social Affairs and Employment under President Clinton. Reich is the author of the book Supercapitalism, in which he argues that people can manifest themselves in society in three differ­ent ways. As ‘citizen’, as ‘consumer’ and as ‘inves­tor’. For actual liberal citizenship, it is of great importance that the values of these three roles are neatly lined up. Take for example child labour. Someone can reject this as a citizen, but as a con­sumer wear clothes made by children, and as an investor buy invest in child labour via his pension fund. Here lies an opportunity for us as a social-liberal party, to let people see these imbalances, to make people aware of the role they have , and encourage their personal strengths. The call for ‘moral leadership’ is heard again and again. And of course, politicians must set the right example. This is something on which also the less action oriented parties should focus more. But as a politician, I see it as my main task to ensure that people themselves can realize their own ideas and ideals about change. For example by giving them insight in and control over the investments made with their pension fund. Or by making sure that people can easily switch to another bank – without losing their personal bank account number – when they believe their bank pays to much salaries and bonuses. By doing so, we provide people with the possibilities to take matters into their own hands and actually act upon their personal ideals. It sure feels better to have put necessary changes in motion yourself, rather than to have waited passively until the gov­ernment has done the job for you.   Wouter Koolmees is a member of Dutch parliament for D66.   Heeft dit artikel uw interesse gewekt? Klik hier voor meer info en abonnementen. – – Dit artikel verscheen in idee nr. 6 2012: Trust in people’s own power, en is te vinden bij het onderwerp participatie.Lees hier het pdf van dit artikel. The uprisings in the Middle East are most fundamentally about establishing a new rule of law. Independent lawyers and judges are crucial in this respect. Mauritius Wijffels analyses what the role of lawyers was, and will be, in bringing about changes. His suggestion: focus on informal circuits and contacts between lawyers and ordinary people. It is there that the magic happens. By Mauritius Wijffels Whilst most of the planet was taken by surprise as the 2010 and 2011 popular uprisings against authoritarian rule in the Middle East unfolded, the strong desire for respect of the rule of law as well as a degree of social justice had been brewing for a while. Certain dynasties fell, like in Egypt, as they stubbornly continued to reject basic legal and social demands whereas others managed to stay in place by quickly giving in sufficiently to avoid being toppled, as was the case in Morocco. Either way, countless members of the legal com­munity and civil society in Egypt and Morocco had been striving during many years for a more positive and constructive role for legal minds in their societies. A comparison of notes on the status of the legal community in both countries shows certain differences but especially strong similarities in the way lawyers and judges en­deavour to achieve a level playing field. First things first Before lawyers and judges in Egypt, Morocco and other countries can live up to their profession­al and social calling of helping to empower the people of their nations in exercising their rights and maintaining their freedoms, two obstacles must first be removed. On the one hand, the basic rights and freedoms that lawyers and judges are held to protect must be laid down unambiguously in solidly written instruments applying equally to all. On the other hand, those same lawyers and judges must be given the right tools and space to implement this protection. What is the situation in this respect in Egypt and Morocco? Both Egypt and Morocco have recognised the need for legislative reform, starting with the Mother of All Laws: the national Constitution. Constitutions are universally considered the ultimate normative touchstone for all ensuing forms of legislation and their implementation. As early as 1 July 2011, after only three months of drafting and following a national referendum without bloodshed, Morocco promulgated a new Constitution containing some very encouraging provisions. These include: the supremacy of international law over national law, the explicit recognition and listing of a large number of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms and the separation of the three classical powers. Thus, the Moroccan Constitution features an independent judiciary, thereby fulfilling a long-awaited disen­tanglement from the executive: the ultimate su­pervision by the minister of justice has been replaced by a special judicial council vice-chaired by the highest judge in the country, the president of the Court of Cassation. Although Egypt was the second Arab country to remove its autocratic regime early in 2011, the process surrounding the creation of a new Constitution is still ongoing and has at times been acrimonious. The current Egyptian draft Constitution does not credit international law or human rights quite the way its Moroccan coun­terpart does but it enumerates a larger number of basic social and economic rights. And in Egypt too, it is currently being proposed that judges should enjoy more independence by replacing the head of state with a special judicial council in charge of appointing the members of the Supreme Constitutional Court, the country’s highest judicial institution. At the expense of the prosecution, judges will also get a much bigger role to play in decisions on any measure involving detention and duress. Good news and bad news The question arises then if these and other consti­tutional reforms suffice to address the aforemen­tioned two obstacles: lack of quality legislation and insufficient empowerment of the legal pro­fessions. As so often in legal practice, there is good news and there is bad news. The good news is that whilst both Constitutions have come un­der severe criticism for not going far enough in meeting the demands of the ‘street’, it would be difficult to deny that they represent a major leap forward in comparison with their predecessors. Especially the Moroccan Constitution has been hailed by many as a massive move forward and an example for the region. The bad news touches on various aspects of the new situation. Firstly, not all rights are equally well protected in the two Constitutions at hand with e.g. wom­en’s and girls’ rights getting a much better cut in Morocco than in Egypt. Secondly, it is not at all clear how both countries will deal with the implementation of the lofty norms and principles they have just adopted. In Egypt, for in­stance, ministerial decrees were largely abused to settle matters in breach of the law or good governance. This malpractice has led to a constitutional proposal that any sanction must be rooted in law. In practice, however, it will prove impossible to swiftly replace the countless exist­ing decrees by laws and to constantly update those laws. Instead of empowering the legal com­munity, this proposal is likely to obstruct lawyers and judges in establishing legal certainty because it will be unclear what rule applies. Thirdly, the past does not just go away. In a coun­try like Morocco, the arbitrariness with which judges have been appointed and dismissed over the past decades and the lack of transparency which has frequently characterised court proce­dures, have seriously exacerbated the already seri­ous public apprehensiveness about the reliability of the judiciary – making almost everybody look bad, even the well-intended. Fourthly but by no means lastly, despite at least formally promoting the independence of the judiciary, the new Constitutions do not appear to provide judges or lawyers with clearly defined protection or min­imum quality standards in line with international law or custom. Time will tell whether these flaws in institu­tions and implementation will be solved. The post-revolution and post-reform political land­scapes will need time to develop and balance out. The call for dignity, rule of law and social justice has not faded and governments remain under pressure to realize these objectives by gradually democratizing state and other leading institutions. Empowering judges and lawyers: formal associations This failure to fully empower the legal commu­nity through the respective Constitutions seems a lost opportunity. In other parts of the world, stable, efficient and independent associations for lawyers and judges have proven helpful in fostering knowledgeable, well-trained and fair legal professionals for the good of the people at large. Judges syndicates and bar associations in the MENA countries can become more effective in enhancing their profession as well as gaining greater popularity with society at large if they are empowered with political, administrative and financial independence. As has been the case elsewhere, it will allow them to elevate their gov­ernance, management, economic means and pro­fessional capacity to international standards such as the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, the UN Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors and the International Principles for the Legal Profession as published by the International Bar Association. These instruments are based on extensive international research and consultation with numerous legal experts and contain solidly phrased standards that enjoy worldwide recogni­tion with regard to key issues such as: independ­ence, integrity, fairness, professional secrecy, conflicts of interest, financial security as well as the relationship with suspects, litigants or cli­ents. In addition, full independence allows these syndicates and associations to provide their members with effective, ongoing education. Apart from improving knowledge and skills, it will armor the institutions and their members with more effective protection vis-à-vis the State, public opinion and, if need be, each other. It would seem desirable, therefore, that the for­mal institutions representing judges or lawyers in Morocco, Egypt and other MENA countries be given the practical support – both domestically and internationally – to meet those relevant inter­national standards. Such formal empowerment of judges and lawyers will, in fact, only represent a logical next step in the realization of the dignity, the government accountability and the social jus­tice that the Arab uprisings have claimed: not only for legal professionals themselves but also for the people whose rights and freedoms they are expected to defend. As recently as October 2012, some 2.300 Moroccan judges gathered before the Court of Cassation in Rabat demanding the actual implementation of their independence guaranteed by the new Constitution including job security, reasonable working conditions, proper remuneration and a pension scheme – without these items being used to pressurize them while performing their tasks. An unusual scene highlighting once more that Constitutional reforms are not enough by them­selves and require proper implementation. Clearly, the post-Arab Spring political land­scapes will need time to develop and balance out. As the protests of Moroccan judges shows, the call for dignity, rule of law and social justice has not faded and governments remain under pres­sure to realize these objectives by gradually de­mocratizing State and other leading institutions. The case for the informal associations These formal associations are only part of the sto­ry, however. The Middle East is not the West. One of the major cultural differences between these two worlds is the way formal circuits, as dis­cussed above, relate with informal circuits within Arab society. Even though informal contacts rep­resent a much bigger key factor for success in the West than many people there are prepared to ad­mit, life in the Middle East is simply unthinkable without its numerous informal circles, in which often the most important contacts and decisions are made. In fact, the weight of the autocratic re­gimes has helped spreading these informal circles rapidly in recent decades – not in the least due to stifling legislation in the field of civil society. As state institutions grew weaker content-wise and slower action-wise, the already traditional informal circles kept growing until they almost outpaced the state and provoked the famous Arab Spring (see the article by Iris Kolman). Lawyers have played an important, empowering role in this context. Many initiatives have branched out from the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, an NGO pre-dating the January 2011 revolution. The so-called Front for the Defense of the Protestors of Egypt is an informal alliance of organisations and individuals, including top-range Egyptian lawyers who volunteer next to their private practice, providing assistance to protestors, especially in case of arrest and deten­tion. Next to helping with the legal paperwork, members of the Front constantly liaise to arrange for food, money and moral support. There are also older examples of lawyer involve­ment with the empowerment of civil society. Apart from being renowned for its campaigning and monitoring activities, El Nadim Centre is a Cairo based NGO which has built up an excellent reputation in providing psychological manage­ment and rehabilitation to victims of torture. In cooperation with other NGOs and individuals it also engages in social support and makes sure the target group gets access to legal aid resources: if not available in-house, lawyers are identified in the informal circles of which El Nadim forms a part. Another famous legal actor established before the revolution is the Hisham Mubarak Law Center, a law firm rather than an NGO, which has built up a reputation for defending human rights activists such as in 2010 the leader of the Arab Network for Human Rights Information, which promotes freedom of expression in the Middle East and which has recently been successful in obtaining judgment against an Egyptian official who had suggested that protesters be burned in ‘Hitler’s incinerators’. The verdict clearly reflects a boost for the protection civilians’ right to free speech. It is important at this point to stress that this support is by no means a ‘male’ affair. Western perception of the status of Arab women is often that they have no status at all and this perception is to an extent confirmed in the un Arab Human Development reports, which have therefore stirred serious emotions. The MENA is full, how­ever, of very independent women, many of whom have played a pivotal role in the uprisings. Female activists and lawyers in the MENA are at least as articulate and highly visible as their male coun­ter-parts, as is the case with renowned activist Ragia Omran, an Egyptian corporate lawyer, who uses much of her spare-time supporting the Front and the Egyptian New Woman Foundation. This foundation – striving for the eradication of all forms of discrimination against women which it considers part of a larger, global struggle for freedom and social justice – started as a feminist study group and spent twenty years developing its activities in different informal and formal ways before it obtained NGO status in 2004. Female lawyers play a leading role in the Foundations’ efforts to raise awareness about gender issues, mainstreaming women’s and girls’ rights issues and achieving women empower­ ment and self-determination through campaign­ing and training courses as well as monitoring and defending women’s and girls’ rights. In line with the above, Egyptian lawyer Dr. Nariman Abdel Kader overcame social prejudice in her direct surroundings, became an activist lawyer and more recently founded the Egyptian Women’s Law and Culture of Peace Organization, aiming to reduce the amount of violence directed toward women and to train young female lawyers to spe­cialize in cases of domestic violence. Her sword is double-edged as her approach both empowers women in civil society and relative newcomers in the legal profession. Finally, high-profile Moroccan-American lawyer Leila Hanafi, involved with many international initiatives, is another example of how legal pro­fessionals help empowering people at an informal level: she was involved in a program tapping into the strong Moroccan tradition of mediation by empowering members of civil society, both as mediators and as beneficiaries. The first group was trained to apply sound techniques and mech­anisms when involved in informal mediation whereas the second group was encouraged to ef­fectively seek redress through mediation to solve disputes in a rapid and effective way – as opposed to lengthy court procedures. Hence, lawyers en­hanced informal civil dispute mediation by trans­ferring skills and know-how to directly affected groups in civil society. The way forward If the West – and in particular a rule of law mind­ed party like D66 – wants to contribute meaning­fully to the democratic developments in the Middle East, it will have to respect and work with local dynamics where formal and informal legal circles will continue to coexist and complement each other for a long time to come – perhaps for­ever. While maintaining its human rights agenda at all times, the West should also take a hard look at itself and admit that the many millions in de­velopment money invested in democratisation processes before the uprisings have more often than not reached others than the lawyers and activists who in the end brought and continue to bring about legal and social change. Instead of conferences about the Arab Spring in glam-orous locations and frequent formal visits by its highest representatives, the eu, its members-states, politicians, lawyers and civil activists would do well determining who are the true ac­tors for change within the formal and informal legal circles and whether they really need vast amounts of money or perhaps completely differ­ent forms of empowerment. Only then can the West expect to help bringing about dignity, rule of law and social justice.   Mauritius Wijffels is a Dutch lawyer with a Middle East related private practice. He is also the founder and chairman of Amsterdam based MELBA Foundation, which promotes the rule of law in the Middle East and Latin America.   Heeft dit artikel uw interesse gewekt? Klik hier voor meer info en abonnementen. – – Dit artikel verscheen in idee nr. 6 2012: Trust in people’s own power, en is te vinden bij de onderwerpen democratie en rechtsstaat.Lees hier het pdf van dit artikel. Can revolutions happen without press coverage? Though a simple ‘no’ might be exaggerated, journalists and reporters usually play an important role in bringing about political change. Hanan Fahmy dives into Egyptian history and explores the position and role of journalists during revolutionary times. By Hanan Fahmy Please visualise the following situation. Just a weekday afternoon in Cairo. The editor-in-chief of the biggest opposition newspaper in Egypt is on his way home. Lost in his own thoughts, he slightly notices the unusually quiet traffic. Suddenly, his car is being hit from behind, and comes to a halt against the sidewalk. Stepping outside to inspect the damage he is immediately surrounded by four men. He is hit hard in his face and stomach, on his neck and legs. He cannot breathe, stand up, shout or defend himself. Cars pass him by, but no one stops to help. One of his attackers snarls at him: ‘This is a warning … You stay away from our Master the President. Next time it will be your head’. The men disappear, leaving the journalist in a state of total confusion. In Egypt, one often hears stories like this. Journal-ists pay a heavy price for their work. Nevertheless, their role in bringing about political change is crucial. With words, journalists teach, inspire and help citizens in their fight for rights, justice and independence. In this article I will show what the role of journalists was in Egyptian revolutionary history in general and the Arab Spring in particular. Egyptian revolutionary history The importance of journalists during oppressive times is of course by no means a recent affair. During the occupation of Egypt by Great Britain, which lasted from 1882 till 1952 for example, journalists played an important role in bringing about revolution. Though many Egyptians were illiterate, the words of journalists – like Abdallah Elnadeem with his magazine ‘Joking and Mocking’ – spread from mouth to mouth. His magazine, and other publications of journalists largely initiated and inspired the Egyptian Revolution in March 1919. That is the moment when newspapers reported that the occupying British authorities had exiled statesmen Saad Pasha Zaghloul and people went out into the streets. Zaghloul had led the official delegation that went to the British consul-general to demand complete independence. The Revolution continued until 1923, when Egypt officially became a parliamen­tary monarchy. The way journalists and their publications affect the people was very well understood by President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who played an important role after the revolution of 1952. To give an example, he nationalised the press in 1960. Without much effect. Journalists still wrote their messages, now however using words with double meanings to bypass censorship. Apart from words with double meanings, journalists also wrote literary stories or rewrote historical ones using real incidents and real historical names to express their opinion about dictator­ship, demanding for democracy. A famous story of this kind is ‘Some fear’ by Tharwat Abaza. Forced relocation As compared to the Nassar period, the news-papers enjoyed more freedom under the Sadat regime in the 1970s. Though he ended the formal censorship of the press, however, President Anwar Sadat tried new techniques to paralyze journalists in their fight against dictatorship. And nevertheless, he founded a council that supervised journalism. Journalists were some­times forced to take on other jobs, such as at the Ministry of Electricity or in Bata Shoe shops. The government considered journalists to be employ­ees that could be simply relocated. Many journal­ists refused the arbitrary relocation, e.g. by suing the government or choosing for exile. Others tried strengthening the role of the Press Syndicate, enabling the labour unions of journalists to more adequately defend its members’ rights, like the right to work as a free journalist. In 1977 the Egyptians revolted against the Sadat government, prompted by the rapidly ris­ing prices of food etc. There were riots all over Cairo, as well as in other cities. Many journalists were arrested and accused of fuelling the discon­tent amongst the population and inciting strife against the state’s economic reforms. Most were found guilty and immediately imprisoned with­out any form of legal process. Consequently, the regime lost a great deal of democratic legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of the Egyptian people as well as western countries. President Sadat then tried to monitor the press in a more subtle way, namely by trying to regain control over the Press Syndicate. At that time, the syndicate’s board consisted mostly of people from opposition parties and movements. This syndicate and newspapers in general heavily criticised the government and its polities. And they knew they were effective. The chairman of the Press Syndicate, Kamel Zoharey, is known to have said that ‘the Power of word is greater than the Power of President’. In an attempt to smother the resistance against his policies president Sadat had more than 3000 public figures arrested, among them well-known journalists. Just one month after these events, president Sadat was assassinated and president Mubarak took power. He released the detainees, allowed the press more freedom and granted people more freedom of expression. Mubarak regime The changes were however not all the way through. Opposition parties and newspapers affiliated with them, were obliged to respect one unwritten rule: they could criticise any official in the country, except the president, his family and the army. But repression mostly took place in an indirect way. Alwafd newspaper for example – owned by the biggest liberal-democratic opposi­tion party in Egypt and critical about economic policies –came into financial difficulties because the regime imposed heavy charges on them and prohibited the publication of advertisements by governmental organizations in this newspaper. Also, the government manipulated the elections more than once, making it impossible for liberal-democratic or other opposition parties’ candi­dates to be elected. In 1996, journalists revolted against a new law which suppressed their relative freedom. And this time not only journalists from opposition newspapers, but also those that worked at gov­ernmental papers refused to accept this new law. At that time, the chairman of the Press Syndicate was editor-in-chief of the biggest newspaper in Egypt, which was owned by the government. He tried to convince the Prime Minister that this law damaged the character of Egypt as a democratic country. Journalists began a large-scale strike. Opposition parties and public figures showed solidarity with the journalists in their struggle for more freedom of expression. The population also showed their support and boycotted news-papers owned by the government. Eventually, journalists gained the upper hand and the law was not issued. The Press Syndicate became a symbol for freedom, and from that time on peo­ple have frequently demonstrated at the door­steps of its headquarters. Losing faith In the 1990s, independent newspapers were founded, owned by actors in the private sector. These newspapers published articles about newly emerging revolutionary movements such as ‘Kafaiah’, which means ‘enough’. Moreover, they broke the ‘unwritten law’ of Mubarak, and criti­cised the President. They again paid a heavy price. The weekly newspaper Aldostour was banned by a court rule. The weekly newspaper Alshaab was banned by the Committee of Party Affairs. Much Egyptians lost faith in political parties adequately representing them. Inspired by activists as George Isak, Wael Abbas or Mohamed Abdel Quodous, young people joined opposition move­ments and became political active. Quoadous was a member of the board of Press Syndicate and a public figure well-known for his fierce fight for democracy. Because of his political criticism of president Sadat as well as president Mubarak, he was arrested many times. The dissatisfaction of the people really took shape during the Presidential elections in 2006. In newspapers, people were encouraged to dem­onstrate against Mubarak’s re-election. Newspapers also published stories about revolu­tions and opposition in foreign developing coun­tries, especially countries in South America and South Asia. Consequently, and again, many reporters were sentenced to prison, like editor-in-chief of the Aldostour newspaper Ibraheem Essa, who in total received nearly a dozen prison sentences. Social media In order to avoid governmental scrutiny, journalists increasingly tried to inform the public in more creative ways. Alternative media such as Facebook groups and other internet pages started to play a larger role in the fight for free­dom. Bloggers published what the newspapers could not or would not publish. A few prominent examples are Asma Mahfouz, Asraa Abedel Fattah and Ahmed Maher. Inspired by people like these, the Egyptian youth put in motion the revolution against dictatorship on 25th of January 2011, de­manding a decent life for all, freedom and justice. After 18 days Mubarak’s regime fell and a new era began in Egypt. Journalists have played an im-portant role in these changes by covering these events and inspiring people. What their role will be in building a new Egypt, is a question that now needs to be answered.   Hanan Fahmy is editing manager of the Alwafd news-paper, a daily newspaper of the liberal-democratic neo-Wafd party in Egypt.   Heeft dit artikel uw interesse gewekt? Klik hier voor meer info en abonnementen. – – Dit artikel verscheen in idee nr. 6 2012: Trust in people’s own power, en is te vinden bij de onderwerpen activisme, communicatie en media.Lees hier het pdf van dit artikel. The escalating acts of war in Syria are not only detrimental to human rights in general, but also to women in particular. The unfolding paradigm change towards female activism has come to a full stop. Active western involvement is required. By Rula Asad and Kawa Hassan The visibility and participation of women in the Syrian revolution – from the very first moment and throughout the nineteen months that the revolution has been going on now to this day – has been impressive. Women have led campaigns for democracy, freedom, dignity, civil peace and against sectarianism. They have organised peace­ful demonstrations in various Syrian cities across the country, and others have acted as spokesper­sons for various political bodies and on every side of the political spectrum. The political awareness has grown in Syria during the revolution, and women in particular, having gained significant experience through observation and participa­tion, have been active in political discussions. Indeed, women have become partners in deci­sion-making processes in their communities. Women have also defended young people in dem­onstrations, protecting them by acting as human barriers between security forces and protesters, and there have been reports of women protecting activists by escorting them across borders, mak­ing use of the fact that the presence of female passengers reduced the likelihood of cars being inspected. The question is: will these changes last? Is there a paradigm shift in the way women participate in politics? Stepping back from Streets The escalation of the Syrian regime’s military operations and the growth of the armed elements of the opposition have brought a substantial back-lash to the political participation of women. Most visibly, acts of war have led women to step back from their active presence in the streets, as it was no longer a safe place for anyone. Instead, women have found roles behind the front lines, for exam­ple in providing medical supplies, fund-raising, and providing care for stricken families. As a result, women’s energy and efforts have been diverted away from claiming their rights and making their voices heard. Reports of women being kidnapped and raped, since August 2011, represent another major setback to Syrian women and female activists. A ‘macho’ masculine men­tality has resurfaced, for instance in the fact that women are being banned from participating in protests or direct action, for fear of attracting ‘shame’. One rape victim told us that after she was raped she came home to find that her hus­band – who had at first encouraged her to go out and protest, and painted the flag of independence on her face – had packed her things and told her not to think of returning to him, or even to see her children. From the streets to social media Such restrictions on their movement forced women to think of alternative ways to continue their activities. Women started to organise sit-ins in houses, and have taken advantage of the free­dom provided by the internet. Indeed, they are actively using social networking sites, especially Facebook, and blogging as a platform to speak freely against oppression and injustice – to voice the ideas which would otherwise be silenced by the militarisation of the conflict. There is a clear need for a safe place to demand and discuss the establishment of a civil, democratic state that guarantees women’s rights and equality. Facebook has provided such a platform; several groups that support Syrian women and where people can discuss a Syrian revolution for women have been started on Facebook. Furthermore, some women who have suffered assault have also spo­ken of their experiences in videos published on YouTube. These new ways open to women to voice their concerns and claim their rights have until now not really materialised into real political opposi­tion groups. Looking at the most important po­litical opposition groups, we find that women’s participation is low. Out of a total of 200 members of The Syrian National Council just 24 are female members despite an earlier statement that a 30% quota for women would be implemented. Women’s representation in the Kurdish National Council does not exceed 7%. The situation is similar in the National Coordination Committee, al­though no accurate figures are available. This situation has fuelled resentment among women working in these groups, as well as among activ­ists in the field. Indeed, women agree that their low political representation does not reflect their new revolutionary roles and sacrifices. The fact is that existing opposition groups have no clearly specified position or programs on wom-en’s issues. Indeed, no group has yet put forward any clear or serious statement about addressing issues of concern to women or preventing dis­crimination – instead, in their manifestos we find just one or two sentences about women’s rights. Most women and female activists – even female politicians active in those political groups – believe, however, that such a general, superficial mention of women’s rights is no more than win­dow dressing intended to convey an image of the group as ‘civilized’. Marginalisation The reality is that politically active women are also hesitant to put women’s issues on the agenda of the groups in which they are active. This is for two reasons. First, because the complex situa­tion and the need for humanitarian relief impose themselves as the only priorities for discussion. Second, a ‘macho’ masculine mentality has pre­vailed in political opposition groups, preventing female members from being effective in their roles. Huda Zein, a former member of the Syrian National Coordination Committee says: ‘As women in the community, we had to include women’s issues in our meetings and our discussions, but we always got engaged in discussing the compli­cated and bloody situation in Syria instead. I ad­mit that was a huge mistake.’ As a result, women are afraid that the issues that concern them will be marginalised in any post-Assad scenario, just as they are now. Specific concerns include the question of reforming current civil and criminal laws, which both limit women’s rights and free­dom, and complete and immediate implementa­tion of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). It is feared that issues of reconstruction, compen­sation for the families of martyrs, and other issues related to the current crisis will be used to justify the marginalisation of women’s rights issue. The recent deterioration of the political envi­ronment for women and an increasing fear that issues of concern to women will be seen to be of secondary importance, has led some women to found their own political movements, albeit hesitantly. A member of the Syrian National Council, Mouna Mostafa, said: ‘We have to set up and es­tablish our own political parties, to ensure we are represented during the transitional phase – otherwise we will have failed to create a space for women in society, the economy, and in politics.’ Precarious paradigm change: Now or never These dual developments are also evident in other countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region where women did pro-actively and passionately participate in revolutions, while their political position has rapidly deteriorated. In his first speech in Tripoli after the overthrow of Kadafi, National Transitional Council (NTC) Chairman Mustafa Abdul Jalil declared on 23 October 2011 that sharia law would be ‘the basic source of legislation, and that any law which contradicts Islamic principles is void’. Muslim broth­ers in Egypt declared that they are in favour of women’s rights ‘as long as they don not contradict with sharia’. In Tunisia, the cradle of these dignity revolutions, the political party Enahda has claimed to retain a secular constitution. However, its ambiguity towards women’s rights, the collusion of Enahda with liberal oriented men and women and the brutal attacks of Salafists against these people constitute real dangers for equal freedoms and rights of all sections in Tunisian society. Therefore the new paradigm of active women’s participation is under pressure in all of these countries, and the momentum to really effectu-ate change seems to have disappeared. It is now or never. The changes that did happen in revolu­tionary times shows the strength of human agen­cy, against all odds. Individuals can not do this on their own, however. An active role of Western ac­tors is required to support Syrian voices that call for gender equality and to translate this new pre­carious paradigm into clear policies. Western ac­tors can provide funding for projects that aim at embedding women’s rights in the constitution. This will ensure gender equality, and the protec­tion and promotion of universal human rights. In addition, they can support projects that aim at strengthening the capacities of women and other new actors in civil society.   Rula Asad is an independent Syrian journalist and women’s rights activist. She graduated from Damascus university in 2006 (journalism), and studied International Affairs and Diplomacy at the Syrian International Academy. Kawa Hassan works as Knowledge Officer at Hivos where he coordinates Knowledge Programme Civil Society in West Asia. He holds a Master’s degree in international relations from the University of Amsterdam, and studied English and German at Almustansyria University, Baghdad, Iraq. He writes about transitions, democratisation and donor assistance in the Middle East.   Heeft dit artikel uw interesse gewekt? Klik hier voor meer info en abonnementen. – – Dit artikel verscheen in idee nr. 6 2012: Trust in people’s own power, en is te vinden bij het onderwerp kansengelijkheid.Lees hier het pdf van dit artikel. Door Thijs Kleinpaste Literature often mirrors current events. In this column Stendhals The Red and the Black will be discussed: human dignity and morality lie at the heart of every revolution. Europe has been careless with its democracy. Ever since the Eurozone crisis broke out, democ­racy has been the victim of severe neglect. When Greek prime-minister Papandreou suggested holding a referendum on his proposed austerity measures, he was quickly put in place by his European counterparts: they would have none of Papandreou’s shenanigans. In 2011, when Berlusconi was replaced by the ‘technocrat’ Mario Monti, many welcomed Monti as the one who would finally take the necessary measures. The tribute some Europeans paid to democracy seems lip-service at most. Democracy doesn’t solve the debt-crisis, hampers quick action and is really only a hindrance in tackling our worst problem! Thank God for technocrats! It is as if some have forgotten that the supreme value of democracy lies not so much in its ability to manage effec­tively, as in providing political decisions with the highest authority, legitimacy and – most of all – decency. Why this is the case, is most accu­rately illustrated in The Red and the Black (1830) by Stendhal (Marie-Henri Beyle), in which the dem-ocratic, egalitarian promises of the 19th-century collide with a slowly dying aristocratic order. In The Red and the Black, the young, intelligent but poor Julien Sorel dreams of making it in a world that is still dominated by the aristocracy. Stendhal published his novel just a few months after the July Revolution of 1830, and it chronicles the last years of the Bourbon Restauration. Julien struggles to find his way up the social ladder, always carrying around a portrait of Napoleon, whom he admires. The days of Napoleon stand in sharp contrast with the restored old order, in which privilege dominated. Stendhal attacks the materialism, shallowness and corruption of the French aristocratic society. If there is to be another Robespierre, the aristocratic elites themselves first and foremost are to blame. One scene between Julien and his employer, monsieur de Rênal, mayor of the small town of Verrières, is especially illustrative. One day Julien feels humiliated after being publicly scolded by monsieur de Rênal, after which Julien angrily confronts him. Monsieur de Rênal (involved in a petty feud about status with some of the other notables in town) is afraid Julien might quit his job: the young man is quite popular in Verrières. But instead of an apology, he offers Julien a raise. However, Juliens dignity cannot be bought or sold: ‘Mere money, how banal!’ he ponders. He takes the raise because he considers it a moral victory over monsieur de Rênal. The latter, being rather tight, only worries about the extra money he now has to spend on Juliens salary. Julian and monsieur de Rênal are living in two worlds which are unable to understand each other. Juliens highest aspiration is not just mate­rial wealth. He simply hopes to be regarded as an equal so that he can climb through the ranks, and become an acknowledged member of the French society. The promise of a democratic, egalitarian society, stemming from the values of the French Revolution, permeates through Stendhals novel, and causes the agitation between the world Julien wants to live in and the world in which he is forced to live in: working in the service of the aristocracy. In this sense the novel contains an acute perspec­tive. It is never just about money, Stendhal says. Democracy and democratic cultures are not so much about the ‘best’ or most lucrative decisions, but about human dignity. When it comes to such dignity, Europe doesn’t provide a very hopeful view for the future.   Thijs Kleinpaste studeert geschiedenis aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam en is schrijver van het boek Nederland als vervlogen droom.   Stendhal, The Red and the Black (Het Rood en het Zwart), 563 p. Amsterdam, 2007. Translation: Hans van Pinxteren.   Heeft dit artikel uw interesse gewekt? Klik hier voor meer info en abonnementen. – – Dit artikel verscheen in idee nr. 6 2012: Trust in people’s own power, en is te vinden bij de onderwerpen democratie en literatuur.