Lees hier het pdf van dit artikel. Jelena Milojkovic-Djuric’s compiled a collection of essays into Balkan Cultural Legacies, which fills in the void in the study of the Balkan region. The lack of use of primary resources among foreign writers and academics that concern themselves with the Balkan Peninsula is one of the reasons why Milojkovic- Djuric took the task of assembling essays from Balkan scholars into one work. By Nitin Sood The collection brings together scholarly essays from a variety of disciplines such as fine arts, literature, history and political science and they all contributed by scholars and authors who come from the region itself. The essays contain information which tends to be unavailable to those Balkan-fanatics who lack the adequate language skills to investigate further the region beyond English or French literature on the Balkans. Milojkovic-Djuric’s Balkan Cultural Legacies indeed succeeds in enlightening the readers about the rather unknown aspects of the Balkan cultural legacies and history and takes us through a journey that could not be experienced through foreign authors and experts on the region. Some of the papers published in the collection take us all the way back to Medieval and Middle Ages. Miloš Blagojevic´’s introductory essay explores the early definitions of the Serbian national identity and statehood, focusing on the formation of the Serbian identity during the Middle Ages. He argues nationalism. Due to the provocations from Milosevic (obviously Tudjman and other nationalistic politicians had a significant role, too) the Serbs and other ethnic groups began to differentiate from each other. Mark Mazower, a historian from Columbia University, argues that under socialist Bosnia and Herzegovina the ethnicity was not as relevant as imagined. Instead of emphasizing religious differences, people in the communist Bosnia and Herzegovina associated themselves with their local communities: according to him localism was an important factor in shaping affliations and loyalties. Hence Blagojevic´’s essay of the formation of Serbian national identity during the Middle Ages complicates the discussion further, demonstrating the complexity of forming national identity in the Balkans. Besides Blagojevic´’s paper on Serbian national identity, Vasilije Dj. Krestic´ also provides a thoughtprovoking insight to the discussion by tackling the idea of Great Croatia. This idea is usually neglected in most works regarding the Balkans. He criticizes Serbian and other experts on the Balkan peninsula precisely for ignoring the idea of Great Croatia that prevailed among a number of leading Croatian authors and politicians since the end of the 19th century. Krestic´ notes how Stjepan Radic´, the founder and President of Croatian Republican Peasant Party, demanded that the map of Croatia should include regions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and even areas extending to Macedonia and Montenegro. Although Krestic´ does bring to our attention a very important aspect of the values that certain Croatians advocated during the 18th and 19th century, his tone against Croatians seems to be particularly hostile which deteriorates the credibility of his text. Perhaps his most shameless claim is the strong prevalence of the idea of Great Croatia, which was located very close to some individual’s hearts, ’provides the answer to the key question of today’s relationships between the Croats and Serbs as well as the reasons for which they fought a war’. I found Krestic´’s text on The Idea of Great Croatia enlighting and discovered myself learning more about the mentality of the Croatians, realizing that it was not only the Serbs who dreamed of a magnificent homeland of their own. However, Krestic´’s naive conclusion that it explains the war and current ethnic tensions in the region neglects to take into account several other events and factors that have contributed to the current situation in the Balkans. Perhaps because of his bitter sentiments about Serbia being at blame all the time, he decided to put the Croats on spotlight but the manner in which he does proves to be biased and unconsolidated. Regardless I believe his work provides us with an insight, that rarely is brought to the wider attention and thus serves good purpose despite owning prejudiced characteristics. There are more essays in Milojkobiv-Djuric’s collection Balkan Cultural Legacies, which offer new and rather captivating perspectives to the Balkan Peninsula. One of the greatest achievements of her work is the fact that the cultural legacies are approached from a variety of disciplines: Slavko Gavrilovic investigates the forced conversion to Catholicism of Serbs in Croatia, Slavonia and Hungary from the 13th to the 19th century, Dinko Davidov discusses art in Serbia in the 18th century and Dimitrije Djordjevic´ examines the impact of the Berlin Congress of 1878 on the Balkan peninsula. Milojkovic-Djuric’s book embarks on a long fascinating voyage to the Balkans, that up to this point has been inaccessible for those who lack the language skills yet still are passionately fascinated about the Western Balkans and its culture.   Nitin Sood is former executive director of Libseen (Liberal South East European Network). Balkan Cultural Legacies: Historical, Literary, and Fine Art Perceptions (2011) Jelena Milojkovic-Djuric New York, The University Press Group Ltd ISBN 9780880336741   Heeft dit artikel uw interesse gewekt? Klik hier voor meer info en abonnementen. — Dit artikel verscheen in idee nr. 6 2011: The rule of law en is te vinden bij de onderwerpen literatuur en cultuur. Lees hier het pdf van dit artikel. In economic and democratic terms, EU accession towards Eastern Europe is a great success. However, implementing laws is not sufficient: eventually they need to be founded on shared democratic values. Former Dutch ambassador for Macedonia Simone Filippini reflects on the progress of this candidate country.   By Simone Filippini Who doesn’t recall the images of December 1989? Images of crying and celebrating inhabitants of East and West Berlin on the day the Berlin Wall fell after having divided the Western and Eastern parts of German’s historic capital for nearly 30 years? The fall of the Berlin Wall provoked euphoria in the entire western world, in particular in Europe. Finally the countries of Central and Eastern Europe would get back their legitimate place in the European family. And of course, membership of the European Union (EU) would be part of their future. The decision to grant all the former socialist countries EU candidate status in the early nineties only constituted a logical next step; the spirits were high. All were convinced that, although the candidates had to work on democratization and state building, these were part of their – European – genes and they would catch up quickly to fully join the European community and embrace its values. Yes, we can! Could we..? Unexpectedly, the heritage of 50 years of communism turned out to be a profound and persistent influence during the accession process. In-depth transformation was felt necessary to create a truly democratic political and governance culture, meeting European standards. Since 2004 twelve states have joined the European Union. All in all we should be proud of what has been achieved. In less than 20 years poor, undemocratic and badly governed countries transformed into democratic states with proper government structures and (relatively) high economic growth, well on their way to create prosperity for their citizens. Enlargement also offered extensive opportunities for EU member states’ businesses. It is justified to conclude that both in economic and in democratic terms the accession process has proved a great success, underscoring the strength of EU so-called soft power. At the same time, however, we have to acknowledge that democratization – not so much the formal part of it, but rather the internalization of key democratic values – has taken much longer than we thought it would; it is still an ongoing process in the member states that acceded since 2004. Citizens in the old EU member states perceive this transition as overly sluggish and have lately shown little patience for reports revealing democratic deficiencies. They want to see countries they can trust and rely on, countries that share their values and respect fundamental rights. The accession of Romania and Bulgaria has done tremendous damage to public perception toward enlargement as a positive process. Stories about widespread corruption and fraud; shady political practices; and a lack of respect for fundamental human rights, especially when it concerns the treatment of minorities and vulnerable groups, have undermined public confidence. EU citizens had expected that, during the accession process, the EU would be able to guarantee that new members would play by the rules and share our democratic values. They are disappointed and have become increasingly skeptical whether the EU can make the necessary difference. What about Macedonia? This is all the more important as the EU is not yet off the enlargement hook. With the Western Balkans actively aspiring membership and the follow-up states of the former Yugoslav Federation banging its doors, the EU faces a next level of challenges. First in line was Macedonia, a small country with 2 million inhabitants north of Greece that gained its independence in 1991 in a bloodless detachment from Serbia-dominated former Yugoslavia. Unfortunately, it immediately became immersed in old feuds with Greece, which claims the name Macedonia constitutes a threat to Greece’s national integrity and security. The Kosovo war of 1999, spilling 300.000 refugees into the Northwestern part of Macedonia, contributed to fueling discontent among ethnic Albanian citizens as to their perceived secondclass position in society. In 2001, after a number of violent clashes between ethnic Albanians and ethnic Macedonians, a civil war could only be prevented by a massive intervention by the international community, led by NATO, the USA and the EU. Macedonia actively worked on getting its act together again and applied for EU membership in March 2004. In December 2005 the EU rewarded its efforts with a candidate status. Since then the country has strived to get a date to start negotiations. And although in its progress report of October 2011 the European Commission for the third time in a row gave a positive recommendation, the Greek-Macedonian name issue stands in the way of further progress. Although, as stated, Macedonia has again received a positive recommendation regarding the start of accession negotiations, the Commission has become more critical of the country. Things do not seem to be automatically moving into the right direction. International human rights watchdogs, as well as institutions following progress on basic freedoms and the rule of law have recently expressed growing concern. Concerns about the directions the third Gruevskiled government is taking, are augmented by perceived nationalist tendencies, symbolized by the project Skopje 2014. This costly scheme involves constructing not only long-overdue government buildings, but also a number of sensitive religious buildings, and a substantial number of monuments of Macedonian heroes. Some of these monuments are contested by neighboring countries. Moreover, in practice the government has shown an uncompromising stand on the name issue, feeding into people’s deeply engrained fears of losing identity and fertilizing the breeding ground for populism, if not nationalism. The government is also perceived to slowly but surely increase its hold on society and to put fundamental freedoms at risk: freedom of the press is on the decline, people report increased anxiety related to freedom of speech, and confidence in the government institutions, including the judiciary, is extremely low. Moreover, heavy investments in the Ministry of Interior over the past years have benefited in particular intelligence and security forces, including the secret service. Government behavior in a number of aspects reminds groups of Macedonians, who still have vivid memories of the former socialist Republic of Macedonia, of their communist past. They claim they recognize the approach. Can Europe? Confronted with these realities the EU and the USA, strong partners in promoting EU membership, sometimes seem at a loss. Despite the best of intentions, a well elaborated framework to stimulate and measure progress, huge financial support, and generous technical assistance, Macedonians have become less inclined to accept – justified – criticisms and suggestions on improvements, while their readiness to listen and work according to the Commission’s advice has decreased. The government seems to have hardened in its resolve to do whatever it feels is right, even if that is contrary to what might be conducive to further progress on the path to EU membership. They now prefer to blame the EU for being hypocritical and applying double standards, by favoring present member states even if they do not act according to the rules, instead of trying to deal with the EU Commission’s suggestions in a constructive manner. As a consequence, the question has come up whether with all its present carrots and sticks the EU is on the right track. If countries underperform, especially in regards to the values and norms put down in the European Charter that serve as fundaments of European unity and the EU members’ identity, is there a way to move them (back) on the right track? Should we not to a certain extent reconsider the accession track and formulate answers to the new challenges that loom with a new group of countries in the waiting room, countries whose history and geography require specific and custom-made approaches? Let us not forget the lessons learned from previous rounds. Although enlargement is a process of technical alignment on the one hand, it is one of high intensity political involvement on the other. Or at least it should be. Reality teaches us, however, that, due to a mass of other urgent and time consuming challenges, not least the economic and financial crisis, EU attention is to a certain extent deflected from other processes in need of active political attention. Neither is it helpful that bilateral interests of one member state sometimes are allowed to prevail over collective interests, in this case the building of a truly democratic, stable and prosperous southeastern flank of the EU. Some will point to the existence of a special Commissioner for Enlargement to argue that the process gets full political support. And certainly, the intentions are there. But are we really looking into the individuality of the challenges and risks the (potential) candidate poses and designing fresh and creative approaches on the basis of that analysis? Or do we prefer to hide behind the substantial technical accession ‘diesel’ and pretend that we are actually taking an active approach? Of course, in Southeastern Europe the EU is confronted even more than before with the extent to which it can influence societies in future member states. How can it influence true internalization of democracy in a population, encourage assertive citizenship, effectively promote tolerance and real political diversity, stimulate a real rule of law, or influence the stand of people regarding diversity? When to apply the carrot, how and when to apply the stick? These are all very topical questions. Get off the beaten track We have to take this issue seriously. Indeed, we cannot help countries that do not want to be helped to help themselves. But enlargement of the EU is not a one-way street. We cannot expect countries located in a historically troubled region, burdened by past and present feuds, to solve their own problems. This is our own backyard; we have a huge vested interest in peace, prosperity and stability in Eastern Europe. And whether we, politicians and citizens in present member states, like it or not: these countries want to and will become members. In a growing EU we have to acknowledge and respect real diversity to be able to survive. Moreover, transformation of societies takes time. Let’s face it: we will not be able to shape all newcomers exactly after our own image. At the same time, precisely because of this diversity we will have to clearly define a bottomline and hold on to it. No compliance, no membership; period. For solutions, let us look beyond governments, whose governance style does not always reflect the values of the general population. Let us think of ways to stimulate assertive citizenship, to sharpen the critical minds of people, to educate and encourage potential but often neglected key influencers like youth and women. And we need to continue to stand up in defense of fundamental rights, to show the EU’s teeth on these issues and not let governments get away with anti-democratic behavior. Future EU citizens should see that we mean business if we talk about fundamental rights and European values, and that they have our full support fighting for them. A reinvigorated approach implies an open mind and sincere discussions on both the EU and the candidates’ sides, honest reports and clear rules of the game; constituting a level playing field for all candidates and present member states. Only if we lead by example we will be credible to others. And in this regard the present EU has a world to win.   Simone Filippini is the Dutch Consul-General in Miami, responsible for the promotion of Dutch- American relations in 10 Southeastern States and the Dutch Caribbean. Between July 2007 and August 2011 she was the Dutch Ambassador in Skopje, Macedonia. Simone has been a member of the D66 National Board (international portfolio) and has been part of several Committees of the party.   Heeft dit artikel uw interesse gewekt? Klik hier voor meer info en abonnementen. — Dit artikel verscheen in idee nr. 6 2011: The rule of law en is te vinden bij het onderwerp Europese Unie. Lees hier het pdf van dit artikel. Though not strictly part of the Balkan region, Turkey and the Balkan countries are closely connected throughout history. Both also have to deal with substantial minorities. How is Turkey doing with respect to the democratic representation of minorities? An exploration of the current constitutional reform process. By Ardu Batu In Turkey, past attempts to broadly engage under-represented minorities, religious groups, and Turkish civil society in the constitutional reform process have failed, and resulted in constitutions that were neither inclusive nor entirely democratic. By incorporating marginalized groups and civil society into the current constitutional debates, the next constitution can be both representative of the needs of Turkish citizens and the growing global movement towards direct and personal democracy. However, in order to understand how to include all voices in the current debates, an assessment must be made of the failures of the previous constitutions and the processes used in creating these documents, to ensure that the same deficiencies are not reproduced. Lessons from the past combined with the input of civil society groups in Turkey and social media and technology platforms might finally result in the creation of a new document, representative of all Turkish citizens. Previous Constitutional ‘Reforms’ The word ‘reform’ implies ‘improvement’ and ‘evolution’, which is not a fitting description for Turkey’s past constitutional experiments. The undertaking of the 1982 constitution in particular can easily be characterized as a devolution. The processes of constitutional reform are nothing new in the Turkish Republic, which has undergone no less then four constitutional reforms and adoptions; in 1921, 1924, 1961 and 1982. The two most extreme examples were the interventions of the military in the civilian state and the subsequent resulting constitutions, although not a single one of the reforms was the result of a democratic dialogue. Large parts of minorities, sects, religious and political groups, including civil society organizations, were at best ignored, and at worst purposefully excluded. More than the content of each respective document, it was the lack of democratic participation in the creation process of the document that led, inevitably, to its successor. More recently, in 2010, the AK Party led state made amendments to the constitution, but again failed to broadly engage under-represented groups and the civil society. The result was a degradation of the separation of powers, particularly concerning the judicial branch, and a degradation of the checks and balances necessary to maintain a truly democratic state. The AK Party has stated that their main focus for the future is the preparation and ratification of a new constitution. Prime Minister Erdogan stated in a parliament address: ‘The nation expected the parliament to rewrite the constitution… The government and AK Party is fully determined about a new constitution, and as AK Party, we want a new constitution to be prepared with the broadest participation possible, and we wish that the new constitution will be a social contract reflecting the demands of all social segments… The structure of the new parliament enables us to rewrite the constitution with the broadest representation and compromise…’. Although the rhetoric put forth by pm Erdogan is hopeful, the failures of previous constitutions and the resulting relationship between the people and their government demands the full inclusion of all groups in creating the content of the document and also in the process of building the foundation and the framework of the new constitution. Waves of reform There have been four waves of constitutional reform in Turkey, and today there is an urgent need for another wave. This wave should fundamentally utilize direct and personal democracy in order to reach out to people and to channel their needs in formulating a new constitution; a new social contract. The application of a methodology based on inclusiveness, one that takes into consideration the needs and views of those from all marginalized groups and that includes civil society is the only sustainable path forward in the development of a new constitution. Through this methodology, the core issues that have previously divided Turkish society can be turned into foundational unifiers: freedom of expression, freedom of religion and identity, separation of powers, and regulations that govern political parties and the electoral system. The diversity of the Turkish population demands that serious efforts be made to ensure equal rights and protection of all Turkish citizens, and to guarantee their freedom to voice their opinions, whether through media or political groups and parties. The current reality is that it has become effectively impossible to establish and maintain political groups and parties for many of the marginalized peoples. Using the European Convention on Human Rights as a guide, of the realization of such legal protection before commencing the discussion of a new constitution would improve and increase the political representation and participation of politically stifled and marginalized groups. Furthermore, the establishment of a clear separation of powers, especially an independent judiciary, will prevent the domination of the political system by one single group. These legal and legislative protections would inherently strengthen Turkish society by consolidating previously fragmented groups into the larger discussion surrounding a new constitution. It should be underlined that opening the formal opportunities for the participation of the civil society or other marginalized parts of society would not by itself guarantee an effective participation of these actors in the preparation of the constitution. The existence of legal guarantees for the protection of the freedom of expression of these actors is also crucial for a democratic process. Turkey has serious issues with respect to freedom of expression and freedom of the press. Human rights organizations such as the Freedom House constantly place Turkey at the bottom of their freedom of expression and press rankings. Accordingly, there needs to be a serious review of the provisions of the Turkish Criminal Code, the Anti-Terror Law, and all other relevant legislation that is effectively used and abused by the Turkish authorities to infringe freedom of expression. Such a revision of these rather authoritarian provisions could also be seen as a confidence building measure among the different parts of the society that will be engaged in the process. Civil Society and technology The ability to engage citizens broadly, deeply, and efficiently has recently taken leaps forward due to the growth of civil society organizations and advances in technology. The utilization of the ubiquitous cell phone and social media as tools for direct democracy has gained momentum and has given its users a literal direct-line to interact with their representatives in the government regardless of location, socio-economic situation or ethnic/religious identity. These changes will undoubtedly be met with resistance by some governments and it will be necessary to establish a more organized and concise message, supported by a significant number of people, to push for real change. It is in this sphere that a developed civil society can act as a vital bridge between the government and the people. While communication between the Turkish government and its citizens has often taken a rigid, one-way, elitist tone, civil society offers an alternative route for groups to have their voices heard. The work of Istanbul based ARI Movement provides a specific example of Turkish civil society in action. Established in 1994, ARI Movement has completed a multitude of projects aimed at engaging Turkish people via media platforms such as Youth lab: Armenia, Turkey, America. This project brings together youths from aforementioned countries for exchange programs which are focused on leadership, volunteerism and cultural exchange. However, the project does not end once the physical grouping of the students is completed, rather, the youths maintain engagement through the implementation of online forums and social media platforms. This expanding role of civil society through the use of social media and technology only highlights the need for its inclusion in the coming constitutional changes. This is why ARI Movement, in collaboration with Stichting International Democratic Initiative (IDI), is now conducting a project on constitutional reform in Turkey, with the vision outlined in this article. The project focuses on one of the most vital aspects of constitutional reform: checks and balances. The project aims to produce a comparative study of separation of power and systems of checks and balances and how they compare to the Turkish case. This study will provide a framework for open discussion among a wide variety of stakeholders, opinion leaders and civil society representatives in a number of roundtable meetings across Turkey. Furthermore, the output of these meetings will be disseminated and discussed on web-based platforms. By raising awareness of the importance of a proper system of checks and balances and by providing comparative information on this topic, ARI Movement hopes to contribute significantly to the constitutional reform process in Turkey.   Arda Batu is a lecturer at Yeditepe University, Political Science & International Relations Department, Vice-Chairman of ARI Movement. He is on the editorial board of Turkish Policy Quarterly and editor in chief of Kalem Journal. He is consultant at Orbis Risk Advisory.   Heeft dit artikel uw interesse gewekt? Klik hier voor meer info en abonnementen. — Dit artikel verscheen in idee nr. 6 2011: The rule of law en is te vinden bij de onderwerpen internationaal en rechtsstaat  Lees hier het pdf van dit artikel. NGOs, or civil society in general, usually have an important role to play in changing society. Compared to other post-communist countries however, civil society organization in the Balkan region did not feature prominently in the first years of the post-Yugoslav transition. The prospect of EU accession might finally define their role as a driver of change. By Jelena Dzankic and Daliborka Uljarevic In most of the post-communist countries, the civil sector has been a societal panacea in the course of transition by providing the indispensable push towards democracy. At the time of the collapse of the communist system, marked by the fall of multinational federations, the rise of civil society through what Michnik called ‘a unifying moment’ implied a distinct worldview. It offered a remedy both for the ‘socialist virus’, and the ‘transition fever’. Representing a detachment from the state-dominated worldview, civil society became the key ingredient for the emergence of a participatory culture based on political pluralism. It is precisely the drive to be independent of state power that could counterbalance the domination of the state in the day-to-day life of the people. The significance of such a role of civil society for the transitional countries lies precisely in the five-decade long rule of the communist party, marked by a virtual nonexistence of a public sphere, a political monolith, and the ‘powerlessness’ of ordinary citizens. Established either as umbrella compacts, or individual interest associations, the first transitional civil society organizations quickly mushroomed with the aim to foster democratic values both by organizing the public sphere and by providing contacts with external organizations. Balkan civil society In the Western Balkans, which have undergone a much more turbulent two decades of transition than their eastern neighbors, civil society organizations play yet another role. In addition to being drivers of political and societal change, civil society is also a mechanism of reconciliation in the region that was torn by the bloodiest conflict that took part on European soil after the Second World War. More than two decades after introducing the multiparty system, the weak Western Balkan states are still facing series of democratic challenges. In this context, civil society in Western Balkans is still in the process of defining its position and role within each of the states. It is struggling with the lack of participatory tradition that would help civil society to flourish and support the process of overall transformation in the region. Civil society has strong emancipatory, transformative potential in post-communist political and social realms, especially in regard to the key pillars of power and the introduction of European values. Of course, strategies and tactics are different. Yet, they result in effective forms of organizing, informing and engaging citizens and the general public of what social processes entail and how they could contribute to them. With the public interest in mind, civil society is pivotal in helping the Western Balkan states not to lose themselves in the murky waters of democratic transition/translation. Montenegrin organizations, similar to their counterparts in the other countries in the region, are a good example of the efforts, challenges and potential that civil society has in the transitional countries today. Civil society in Montenegro As a consequence of the small country’s political trajectory after the breakup of Yugoslavia, and the dominance of the political issues related to statehood and nationhood, there has been a lot of prejudice about the civil society in Montenegro. Simultaneously, the overall development was burdened by great expectations both domestic and international, not the least because of the internal societal schism, but also because of the prominent role that civil society had in Central and East European transitions. Yet, the reality of civil society in Montenegro, similar to other countries in the Western Balkans, has been challenged by low political responsiveness, financial constraints, and the public’s occasional failure to understand that societal change requires not activities of non-governmental organizations, but also collective participation. Even in this context, civil society is investing tremendous effort in bringing about democratic change and regional reconciliation, which are prerequisites for accession into the European Union (EU). The major challenge that the Montenegrin civil society organizations are faced with is their limited impact in the law-making and policy process. There are two key reasons for this challenge, not only for the Montenegrin context, but also to the rest of the region. First, governmental trust in civil society organizations is low, which manifests itself as a reluctance on behalf of the government to cooperate with these organizations on key issues that the society is faced with. In particular, various segments of Montenegrin public administration see civil society as an impediment, rather than a motor of positive societal change. Second, the platform for the participation of civil society in a structured policy dialogue is rather weak. Despite the attempts of the civil society organizations to clearly define the terms of their participation in the policy dialogue, these have found little resonance with the public administration that is often closed for constructive criticism and dialogue. In the context of Montenegro’s aspiration to become an EU Member State, this challenge has been slightly facilitated by the mediating effect of the international actors, which have resulted in the opening of some channels for institutional cooperation, particular with the office of the Premier of Montenegro, but it takes far too much time to mainstream this as working principle. Another challenge that Montenegrin civil society organizations are faced with is related to scarce financial resources at their disposal. The majority of the civil organizations remains financially dependent on the state, while only a limited number of civil society organizations has benefitted from the EU’s pre-accession funds. Subsequently, through the lack of financial means, necessary for the operation of civil society, civic participation in political decision-making is marginalized. Given the withdrawal of many donors that supported the non-profit sector during the crisis years in the post-Yugoslav space, nowadays the major source of funding for Montenegrin civil society organizations is a governmental commission, which supports projects in the fields of social protection and humanitarian activities, needs of disabled people, sport development, non-institutional education and education of children and youth, culture and technical culture, and combating drugs and other types of addiction. Yet, funding is scarce, and the number of non-profit organizations applying to the commission is three times higher than the number of those who actually receive funding or partial funding for their projects. A further issue that has been raised is the lack of transparency in allocating funding for projects. As noted in a number of international reports, the Centre for Civic Education observed the work of the commission and revealed a number of violations of grant allocation procedures. The third major challenge that civil society organizations in Montenegro are faced with is their relation with the Montenegrin public. Much time was needed to raise public awareness of the fact that NGOs cannot fill up all the gaps in the functioning of the system and that civil society cannot be the exclusive foundation of a solid value framework, or erase social dissatisfaction. Yet, in recent years, the Montenegrin public has come to understand that civil society can work to improve the situation, contribute to the implementation of certain standards and principles, and empower citizens to take stock of their rights and understand the ways they can fight for them. Civil society can provide active, constructive response to the challenges Montenegrin society is facing, monitor the work of decision-makers, and cooperate with them on a constructive basis. Having emerged from a socialist system, as other countries in the region, Montenegro has no tradition of NGOs, which makes the situation even more difficult. However, the times are changing quickly, and the key asset of NGOs lies in its people: serious, young, highly educated, hardworking, energetic, creative, with advantages of advanced computer literacy, and knowledge of foreign languages. These young professionals with the courage to think independently are the main driver of change in Montenegro. Their capabilities and continuous work help to keep the Montenegrin reality colored by civil society, which remains vibrant despite all the challenges that it has been facing so far. General conclusions and remarks The development of civil society in the postcommunist world, and especially in the Western Balkans, has faced numerous problems. As a consequence of the particular post-Yugoslav experience, civil society organizations did not feature as prominently in the first years of transition. This is mostly due to the sapping of society’s energies through the conflict that was taking place in multiple republics of the former Yugoslavia. However, as a result of the attempt of many post-Yugoslav states to join the EU, some aspects of civil society in the region have evolved, contributing to overcoming the problems of the heritage of communism. Hence, the time for civil society organizations in the Western Balkans is now, as they need to invest all of their effort to bring closer the last of the fold into the EU nest.   Jelena Dzankic is Jean Monnet Fellow EUI (Florence), Senior Research Fellow Institute Alternative (Podgorica). Daliborka Uljarevic is executive director of the Centre for Civic Education (Podgorica).   Heeft dit artikel uw interesse gewekt? Klik hier voor meer info en abonnementen. — Dit artikel verscheen in idee nr. 6 2011: The rule of law en is te vinden bij het onderwerp mensen onderling.    Lees hier het pdf van dit artikel. Serbs living in Croatia, Grecians in Albania, Albanians in Macedonia. Large ethnic minorities exist throughout the Balkan peninsula. The resulting inter-ethnic conflict is part of the reason why minority policies are now incorporated in EU accession procedures. Does more structure help in implementing these policies? Door Simonida Kacarska By the end of June 2011, Croatia had completed the longest accession negotiations in the EU history and is now to become the 28th member state of the EU in mid-2013. The last issue that was settled between the Croatian government and the eu was the newly established chapter 23, which deals with the judiciary and fundamental rights1. An important aspect within this chapter is its inclusion of minority rights, which are significant not only for Croatia, but also in the wider Balkan region. The position of the Serbs in Croatia inevitably affects the country’s relations with Serbia, just as the position of Albanians in Macedonia has implications for its cooperation with Kosovo and Albania. This is why in the Croatian case, the EU decided for the first time to include minority policies into the formal structure of the negotiations process by assigning tasks to the national government. Since Croatia was the first country to have such issues included in the negotiations it is interesting to see whether the grassroots stakeholders in this field see the inclusion of minority policies in formal EU accession negotiations as a beneficial development for the implementation of these policies. What is Chapter 23 about? Chapter 23 deals with some of the politically most contested topics in the previous enlargement such as the judiciary, the fight against corruption and fundamental rights. Anyone familiar with European affairs will be aware that there are no common rules on these policies in the EU. Hence, this new chapter is largely based on principles of good practice that are beneficial for the development of the rule of law. The topics dealt with under each of these headings are country-specific, but minority policies are bound to be prominent in all countries in the region. Hence, the formalisation of minority policies in the negotiations provided additional tools for the eu to influence the implementation of minority policies. In order to evaluate whether this formalisation works in practice, I spent the last year in Brussels and Zagreb discussing the usefulness of the new chapter 23 with people from the European commission, national governments and civil society organisations. The European Commission is the natural starting point for obtaining insight into the conditions that the EU puts forward to candidate countries. Not surprisingly, most of the Commission officials who I interviewed agreed that formalising minority issues adds an element of structure to the accession process, thus making their work easier. At the same time, EC officials recognised that since the EU does not have a single policy on minorities, it is difficult to set a minimum of basic rules that would apply to all accession countries. In this context, national legislation can however provide a resource for recommendations, as was noted by several of my interlocutors. A Commission official argued that the Commission basically supports the implementation of national legislation on the topic, which is already present and of rather good quality. National officials stand at the receiving end of the EU accession negotiations and are responsible for bringing the recommendations from the European Commission to life. Croatian national officials considered that the new chapter has helped them to realize reforms that they would otherwise not have been able to push forward. Also, the chapter has established some initial results, in relation to the Roma issue for example. The lack of common rules however has provided difficulties for these national officials as at times they almost had to ‘guess’ what it was that the Commission wanted. In general, grassroots stakeholders in Croatia argued that the negotiations have considerably helped to put issues on the agenda that has thus far been neglected. They also considered that the EU has been very successful in pushing the national authorities to deal with issues such as refugee return and war-related crimes. Not surprisingly, the civil society organisations concerned generally supported the EU’s involvement in these policies and saw streamlining of the minority policies in the negotiations as a positive development. Notwithstanding the general support of the formalisation of minority policies however, all of the people that I talked to did express doubts about the sustainability of some reforms and their weak implementation record. A common example of a policy that only exists on paper is the representation of minorities in the public sector. Although guaranteed by law and included in the formal negotiations, progress on this field has been slow and problematic. For this reason, Croatian NGOs have even argued against the concluding of the negotiations, calling for a domestic mechanism to monitor the fulfilment of the remaining conditions.2 The negotiations have however been concluded and it remains to be seen whether the EU will be able to influence any further positive change prior to Croatia’s EU accession in 2013. Lessons learned The introduction of the new chapter on the judiciary and fundamental rights in the accession negotiations with Croatia, chapter 23, was a most important new step in the formalised structure of accession negotiations. Minority rights are a crucial issue in this chapter, which was considered to be the most problematic part of the negotiations. This novel approach of dealing with minority issues in a formalized, structural framework has resulted in different experiences and lessons learnt which are significant to the other countries in the region. In general, the formalisation of minority policies is valued positively both at the European Commission and on national levels. Nevertheless, as was the case with the previous enlargement, there remains criticism of weak implementation records, as was exemplified by the limited representation of minorities in the public sector. The structural inclusion of minority policies in the EU accession process therefore is beneficial, but not a guarantee of success.   Simonida Kacarska is a PhD candidate in the School of Politics and International Studies, University of Leeds, United Kingdom and a Chairperson of the Assembly of the European Policy Institute in Skopje, Republic of Macedonia.   Heeft dit artikel uw interesse gewekt? Klik hier voor meer info en abonnementen. — Dit artikel verscheen in idee nr. 6 2011: The rule of law en is te vinden bij het onderwerp internationaal.  Lees hier het pdf van dit artikel. The biggest challenge facing the European Union today is to clarify the European idea and ideals to European citizens, and the benefits the EU brings to them. One generation ago, this did not seem a problem. The peoples of Europe were still recovering from two world wars and a series of earlier conflicts that had ravaged their continent. Until 1945, virtually no decade had been without war or armed conflict in Europe. The concept of the EU as an instrument to bring lasting peace to the continent was broadly accepted. Presently, a large part of Europe has known uninterrupted peace for almost seventy years. Peace has become so self-evident that new generations can hardly imagine it may not last forever. For this reason the EU, in order to stay relevant and worthy of continued efforts in the eyes of its population, urgently needs a new objective and challenge. But whatever way one looks at it, this seems a remarkable circumstance. Especially if one remembers how an important part of Europe – the Balkans – exploded in violence after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1991 and the disintegration of the federal state of Yugoslavia. To the Netherlands, the traumatic events in Srebrenica are only too familiar. That was not even twenty years ago! In the more recent past, however, the Balkan countries that were not yet EU member states have become official candidates or are moving towards candidate status. Albania, for example, has been recognized by the EU as a potential candidate country. And from the start of this development, peace has become a reality to this part of Europe as well. In the Balkans it has lasted for more than fifteen years now, longer than ever before in this area – except for the period that Tito’s dictatorial rule kept the different groups together. That the Americans are the first to be thanked for this peace, while the EU had a merely indirect influence, is a fact Europe should draw lessons from. It should be made more clear that unity in European policy is directly connected to issues of life and death! But even now, the Balkans still remain Europe’s hothouse plant. In order to protect it and make it grow, irreversible steps must be taken soon. Turkey’s story with the European Union may serve to underline the imperative for taking such irreversible steps at the right moment. For time and tide wait for no man. In 1964, pledges were made to offer Turkey the perspective of accession. Because this development was not forcefully stimulated further and it was not accepted that developments, once set in motion, could also be accomplished after accession, external factors of a completely different nature, (such as mass immigration of Muslims to Europe and the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001) was free to generate a sentiment in the EU against Turkey’s accession. Even if this sentiment would reverse, it would remain questionable now whether Turkey itself would not come to different choices. As a result the rapidly growing Turkish economy, which already ranks amongst the world’s ten largest economies, could take shape not within but outside Europe. The opportunities brought by the expansion of a country with nearly 80 million inhabitants would then unnecessarily be lost to the European economy. The history of Turkey and the EU shows that certain political in-principle decisions have a limited shelf life, and do not remain valid in eternity. It is not only important to take decisions, but also to timely act upon them. The lesson from Turkey should be borne in mind when looking at developments in the Balkans, with Albania as well as with Serbia.   Eddy Schuyer   Heeft dit artikel uw interesse gewekt? Klik hier voor meer info en abonnementen. — Dit artikel verscheen in idee nr. 6 2011: The rule of law en is te vinden bij de onderwerpen Europese Unie  en internationaal.Lees hier het pdf van dit artikel. High levels of corruption still hinder a proper functioning of government and businesses in many countries in the Western Balkan and Turkey. In 2010, Transparency International, leading the global fight against corruption, published a report explaining why progress is lacking in these countries. Countries seeking membership in the European Union (EU) have a range of requirements that must be met for entry into the union. Candidate and potential candidate countries, all of which can be found in South Eastern Europe, have the obligation to ‘show progress’ on, for example, their anticorruption efforts and broader areas of good governance before they are allowed to join. Yet such a stipulation is challenging for many of these countries and is often one of their greatest obstacles to EU accession. Based on findings from Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (2010), most EU accession countries fall among the lowest two-thirds on the 178 country list – and significantly below the average score for European Union member states.1 Moreover, the rate of reported bribery for users of state services among EU accession countries (namely the Western Balkan nations and Turkey) is nearly four times what is measured among EU members. This article presents an overview of the progress in implementing anti-corruption laws in four candidate countries in South Eastern Europe: Kosovo, Albania, Macedonia and Turkey. What are the main obstacles in implementing these reforms? Measuring Progress The Western Balkan countries and Turkey view the opportunity of EU accession as a great motivating factor to adapt their anti-corruption laws to the European standard and make their governments more transparent. However, while EU progress reports on accession countries now assess anti-corruption and governance advances, there is no systematic set of indicators that are used. This prevents the creation of a baseline to measure sustained progress in specific areas, such as the passage and implementation of laws. It also makes it impossible to set benchmarks that qualify what accession countries need to do to secure entry. Entering the EU thus remains a moving target. Furthermore, legal reforms do not always equate with institutional and cultural changes. Transparency International (TI) wanted to better capture and quantify this divergence. It organised a study of existing anti-corruption laws and their implementation in four accession and pre-accession countries: Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia and Turkey. Drawing on the EU requirements for membership, the study established a set of good practice indicators which focused on the judiciary, legislature and public sector. The findings, published in a 2011 report, underscore how the four countries have managed to put some notable legislation in place. Perhaps drawn by the allure of EU membership, reform initiatives in recent years have strengthened legal frameworks to address corruption risks in the three institutions assessed. However, the findings also reveal the ways in which low capacity and weak governance have created a startling gap between law and practice. Understanding the Gaps According to TI’s study, there are common crosscutting issues that are undermining anti-corruption progress across all the institutions and countries assessed by the report. These weaknesses have compromised the institutional resources, independence, transparency, accountability and integrity required to combat corruption and promote good governance. Each of the factors profiled on the previous page have undermined the ability of the judiciary, legislature, and the public sector to function with efficacy and efficiency. Unfortunately, such obstacles are not restricted to one institution but often are symptomatic of a chronic and persistent problem. Why is progress lacking The commonality of shortfalls across all four countries and institutions signals that the deficits run deeper than a simple failure to pass pending reforms. The implementation failures must be understood and corrected as part of moving each country towards EU accession. Below is a brief overview of some of the specific challenges in each of the four countries. To start with Albania. According to recent assessments, some of the greatest challenges compromising the country’s integrity are the implementation gaps in its anti-corruption legal framework, the lack of judicial impartiality and low professionalism of its law enforcement. Findings have shown that the judiciary and legal system in Albania is considered the second most corrupt institution in the country.5 With the courts seen as biased, there is a lack of motivation to fight corruption and perceived ineffectiveness of law enforcement. Moreover, parliamentarians, ministers and judges in Albania continue to have ex-officio immunity, blocking attempts to prosecute high-ranking officials. In Kosovo, public opinion largely points to the worsening situation of corruption in the country. Of those polled, 73 per cent said that corruption has increased in the last three years; more than 60 per cent classified the country’s fight against corruption as ineffective.6 Political parties in the country were considered the most corrupted institution, followed by the judiciary.7 Although the country has adopted a wide-range of legislation, most of it is not being implemented or it lacks provisions for strong sanctions. For example, implementation failures of the country’s access to information laws have been well-documented. Similar to Kosovo, anti-corruption implementation gaps in Macedonia are seen as complicating the country’s integration process with the EU. While Macedonian legislation allows for comprehensive anti-corruption provisions, low capacity on the part of public institutions, as well as governance and integrity issues, have compromised the laws’ application. Many of the relevant institutions in the country have insufficient budgets and independence from the executive. For example, political interference in the appointment and dismissal of judges can later result in biased court decisions, thus undermining the judicial system. Other challenges include the lack of integrity of public officials due to poor implementation of codes of conduct. Finally, there is a lack of relevant and effective education and training of public officials responsible for the implementing anti- corruption legislation. In Turkey, low levels institutional capacity (e.g. financial, human and technical) have affected the fulfilment of duties legally designated to the judiciary, legislature and public administration. This has resulted in increased inefficiencies and opportunities for corruption. For example, Turkey has some of the highest rates of petty bribery (33 per cent) among public sector services in the region9 and the country’s civil service is viewed as Turkey’s most corrupt institution.10 A deep-rooted tradition of a protected, secretive state has meant that concepts like ‘conflict of interest’ and ‘ethical behaviour’ are relatively new and not fully embraced concepts. Immunity laws that protect officials from prosecution have created apathy among the public that corruption can be combated and would require societal changes – and the political will – to address it. Areas for reform Addressing the identified obstacles in the fight against corruption can help all four countries advance towards meeting related EU governance requirements. Regionally this would involve measures to improve institutional transparency, accountability, integrity, independence and resources. Specific areas for action in each country include the following. Albania: Ensuring a meritocracy-based public administration and promotion of civil servants; reforming and regulating the function and organisation of the judiciary and parliament (National Assembly); publishing, drafting and making publicly available periodic reports on the activities of public institutions; and prosecuting all individuals accused of corruption. Kosovo: Ensuring that the Kosovo Anti-corruption Agency and other relevant oversight bodies have the capacity to monitor compliance and punish violations; monitoring and sanctioning political interference in other branches of government; ensuring the full implementation of merit-based and competitive criteria for public sector positions and political appointments; and strengthening independent oversight institutions, such as the Independent Oversight Board of Civil Service, and the Procurement Review Body, as well as the Anti-Corruption Agency. Macedonia: Allowing the judiciary to prepare and propose its own budget and defend it in front of the National Assembly (parliament); developing a precise merit-based system for the selection and promotion of judges; approving a specific law for the effective, systematic and institutional protection of whistleblowers; introducing a provision to the Law on Public Servants for a merit-based system of hiring; and introducing further amendments to legislation in order to strengthen the role of the National Assembly (e.g. audit findings; increased accountability of members of parliament, etc.). Turkey: Ensuring the separation of powers among the institutions; approving a new law to regulate political campaign and party financing; limiting the immunities provided to members of parliament; guaranteeing citizens’ right to information and punishing non-compliance; and providing transparent and merit-based civil service recruitment. For these actions to be successful locally and regionally, they require support. The international community (including the European Commission and regional organisations) has a responsibility to provide resources and policy guidance to ensure they are advanced. National governments, for their part, must have the resolve and political will to make the necessary governance shifts. Throughout the process, all actors, including civil society, must get engaged to ensure that the key governance deficits that prevent EU accession are effectively closed.   Craig Fagan is senior policy coordinator at Transparency International.   Heeft dit artikel uw interesse gewekt? Klik hier voor meer info en abonnementen. — Dit artikel verscheen in idee nr. 6 2011: The rule of law en is te vinden bij het onderwerp transparantie.  Lees hier het pdf van dit artikel. The Balkan countries have a bad reputation as a region of bloody interethnic conflicts. These conflicts are however of a rather recent date, and are the result of the construction of conflicting national identities by intellectuals and Western powers. Fortunately, young scholars increasingly put forward a different understanding of Balkan history and culture in a ‘European’ spirit of tolerance and pluralism. Door Raymond Detrez EU enlargement through the – achieved or forthcoming – accession of the Balkan countries has not brought about an enlargement of the average knowledge about and interest in the Balkans as a particular European region. As the avalanche of publications about the conflicts in Yugoslavia and the almost complete disregard of the post-1989 developments in other Balkan countries indicate, attention is paid to the Balkans only when it is afflicted by misfortune. This attitude has led to a regrettable ignorance of local sensibilities and cultural traditions, resulting in errors of judgment by international decision makers’ dealing with the Balkans. Europe became interested in the Balkans in the beginning of the nineteenth century due to the political tensions that were emerging in this region at that time. Western Enlightened ideas about civil rights and freedoms and national self-determination entered the Balkans and turned into a factor contributing to the destabilization of the autocratic Ottoman Empire which the Balkans was a part of. However, many of these tensions were to a large extent provoked by the European Great Powers themselves. They were related to the international issues which from the mid-nineteenth century onwards were known as the ‘Eastern Question’. Russia supported the Balkan national movements in order to further weaken the Ottoman Empire with the aim of acquiring free access to the Mediterranean through the Bosporus. Western powers did their utmost to maintain the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire or – if this failed – to have a hold over the new independent Balkan states in order to prevent the Russian fleet from controlling the eastern Mediterranean and endangering Western sea routes to the Near East and Asia. The Balkan peoples themselves became the plaything of the Great Powers and were often used against each other. As a result, the Balkans was perceived as a troublesome region and the term ‘Balkan Peninsula’, which was introduced in the 1830s, from the very beginning acquired a pejorative connotation. As the national movements in the Balkans reached their peak (in the 1870s) and the new Balkan states embarked on enlarging their respective territories at the expense of the Ottoman Empire or of each other (during the 1912-1913 Balkan Wars), this unfavourable perception was even reinforced. Finally, the accelerated construction of a European identity in the early 1990s – the time of the Maastricht Treaty, coinciding chronologically with the Yugoslavian crisis – seems to have required an essentialization of the Balkans in systematic opposition to a Europe which was rather wishfully imagined as ethnically and religiously pluralist and tolerant. Significantly, a conflict involving only (a part of ) one single Balkan country, Yugoslavia, has almost invariably been called a ‘Balkan’ war, thus stigmatizing the entire peninsula. Thus, from the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Balkans have been regarded as a disordered and unruly part of Europe. However, the popular image of the Balkans as an area of ‘irrational ethnic conflicts’ and ‘age-old ethnic hatred’ is rather deceptive. Whatever one may think of the – famous or notorious – Pax Ottomana, Ottoman rule created the conditions for various ethnic and religious communities to coexist without major conflicts with each other. To be sure, the Pax Ottomana was based on religious segregation and discrimination of Christians and Jews by Muslims; however, the Ottoman authorities never attempted to systematically and violently Islamize the population and even if we assume that there was a considerable hostility between religious groups, relations between ethnic groups within the same religious community as a rule were harmonious. In general, people in the Balkan had much less ‘bad experiences’ with each other than people in Western Europe, where prior to the Enlightenment ethnic and religious intolerance was paramount and nations were almost constantly engaged in lengthy and devastating wars. Linguists cannot help noticing the striking similarities between the grammatical structures of the Balkan languages, constituting a genuine ‘Balkan linguistic union’. Victor Friedman, an authoritative Balkan linguist, explains these similarities referring to ‘centuries of multilingualism and interethnic contact at the most intimate levels’. Anthropologists and culturologists have revealed that these centuries of interethnic contacts also resulted in the emergence of a ‘Balkan cultural union’ – a common Balkan culture, based on a shared moral (but also, for instance, aesthetic) value system. They discovered the same customs and habits, the same folk music (with features as diaphony and asymmetric rhythms), the same folk tales, the same ornaments on houses, pottery and costumes, the same popular beliefs, briefly the same mental make-up all over the peninsula. This does not mean that Balkan culture is uniform or homogeneous; on the contrary, it is quite diversified, but in a way that reminds of the dialects of a single language. Anyhow, the differences are regional and not national. All Balkan peoples share one single mentality, which in spite of all current divisiveness often generates a kind of mutual understanding and solidarity, especially in the presence of ‘Westerners’. In addition, among people that shared one and the same religion – be it Islam or Orthodox Christianity – common ‘high cultures’ emerged which even more blurred ethnic distinctions. By the end of the eighteenth century, common doctrines, common religious practices and liturgical feasts, the typical architecture and painted ornamentation of the Orthodox vaulted cross-in-square churches, the pilgrimage to the Holy Land, the use of Greek as the language of worship and cultural communication by virtually all Orthodox Christian intellectuals had created stronger feelings of cultural commonality than those characteristic of ethnic communities. Only few scholars in the Balkans will agree with the concept of a single Balkan culture or of supra-ethnic religious communities that minimizes or even ignores the prominence of ‘national identities’, though this concept is generally accepted by Balkanologists outside the region. ‘National (high) cultures’ in the Balkans were constructed by intellectuals in the nineteenth century as amalgamates of elements, selected from the local variants of the common Balkan (low) culture, language being promoted as the main distinctive feature. However, nation building was a process of Westernization in the first place. Balkan capitals, in spite of their symbolic function as the embodiment of national identity, are all ‘Western’ cities, whose national character in most cases is limited to folkloristic architectural ornaments. Nevertheless, Balkan intellectuals as a rule are obsessed by national identity which they believe to be characteristic of all worthy manifestations of cultural life. They constructed national communities that were ethnically (linguistically, culturally, even racially) ‘pure’, occupying areas that were equally ‘pure’, that means in which the ‘other’ (who in the ethnically mixed Balkans is always present) was systematically ignored. These ‘national identities’ were not based on empirical observation, but moulded to serve political aims. Balkan ‘nation builders’ always imagined national identities as different as possible from those of their neighbours in order to be able to draw clear-cut borders and to defend the nation against those neighbours’ territorial claims. Or they claimed adjacent territories themselves, labelling their populations as co-nationals who ought to live within the borders of their own nation state. In addition to ethnic rights, historical rights were resorted to as well. The fatherland to be restored after the abolishment of Ottoman rule was the mediaeval kingdom or empire – the Byzantine Empire, Tsar Symeon’s Bulgaria, Tsar Dušan’s Serbia – at the moment of its largest territorial expansion. And again, the re-established state had to be, just like the mediaeval realm allegedly was, ethnically and religiously ‘pure’, that means without ‘others’ and especially without ‘Muslim others’. Through education, media, arts, official commemorations et cetera, the nineteenth-century understanding of the national character, of the nation’s history with its victories and defeats, of the alleged injustices suffered by the nation and the nation’s allegedly justified claims gradually turned into a ‘national creed’ which is not tolerated to be disbelieved in or critically assessed, especially by foreign scholars. The Balkan intellectuals’ fixation on national identity results not only from nation and state building concerns, but also from the awareness of its actual immaturity and an ensuing lack of self-confidence. The modern Balkan nations came into being only in the nineteenth century in circumstances of unremitting suspense about the criteria distinguishing one nation (including one’s own) from another. Under Ottoman rule, religion and not language or ethnicity was decisive. In the nineteenth century, Albanian, Bosnian, Bulgarian and other Muslims in the Balkans thought of themselves as Turks, just as many Orthodox Albanians and Bulgarians considered themselves to be Greeks. Croats, Serbs and even Slovenes were perceived and perceived themselves now as one nation, now as different nations, as did the Bulgarians and the Macedonians. The formation of clear-cut national identities was a painful process, requiring a dramatic mobilization of all intellectual forces and in many cases even the use of violence. In addition, as the new Balkan nations (including the Turks) wanted to construct a national identity that was ‘European’ and increasingly perceived themselves with the Orientalist bias of Westerners, they faced the impossible task to cleanse their identity from all ‘Oriental’ elements that had remained from five centuries Ottoman rule. At the same time, due to the traditional anti-Catholic attitude of the Orthodox church or to the influence of Russian radical socialist thinking, many people in the Balkans rejected Westernization (involving secularization and capitalism), with the surprising result that among the sincerest advocates of Westernization in fact the progressive ‘Turcophiles’ could be found, supporting of the ambitious Tanzimat reform project, launched by the Ottomans. People in the Balkans are to blame themselves as well for the bad image their region has abroad. Their obstinate insistence on the role of armed freedom fighters and guerrilla warfare and on heroism and martyrdom in their respective national histories (or national mythologies) has in fact reinforced abroad the image of the Balkans as an area of bloody ethnic conflicts. In reality, the concern for modern education and the commitment to democratic reform have played a much more prominent role in many of the Balkan national movements – a fact which unfortunately is not reflected in most Balkan history books but deserves to be kept in mind by those who deal with the Balkans. Fortunately, there is in the Balkans an increasing number of courageous scholars who are inclined to an understanding of the past not in terms of heroes and martyrs and not from a narrowly national perspective, but in a ‘European’ spirit of pluralism and tolerance. They do not occupy important academic positions, they hardly have any substantial influence on public opinion and they are powerless to prevent politicians from resorting to populist and nationalist discourses. It might be wise, though, in addition to all other measures insisting on regional cooperation, free access to international media and modernization of university education, to support these scholars by involving them in international projects and policy making and thus increase their authority at home. Only they can, in the long run, bring about the change in mentality that may free the Balkan communities from their obsessive preoccupation with ethnic and national issues and turn into tolerant and open-minded civil societies. Unfortunately, the Flemings and the Dutch for the time being are not in the best position to teach lessons to others on how to overcome nationalism and xenophobia.   Raymond Detrez is a professor of Eastern European history and cultural history at Ghent University in Belgium. His research focuses on Balkan history from the eighteenth through the twentieth century.   Heeft dit artikel uw interesse gewekt? Klik hier voor meer info en abonnementen. — Dit artikel verscheen in idee nr. 6 2011: The rule of law en is te vinden bij de onderwerpen cultuur, geschiedenis en internationaal.Dit artikel bevat figuren en tabellen. Lees het pdf  om de tabellen te bekijken. The Balkans form a geopolitical region in Southeastern Europe on the Balkan Peninsula (the Balkans as geopolitical region and the peninsula are not completely synonymous), and is named after its mountainous terrain (balkan means mountain in Turkish). The Balkans comprise all of the following countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Greece, Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro. Large parts of Croatia en Serbia lie in the Balkans; Romania, Slovenia and Turkey only for a small part. Of these, Greece (since 1981), Slovenia (since 2004), Bulgaria and Romania (both since 2007) are EU members. Turkey, Macedonia, Croatia and Montenegro are candidate countries, while Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Serbia are potential candidates. The region has over 50 million inhabitants. Economy Much of the discussion about the Balkan countries becoming EUmembers revolves around money. How much will they ‘get’ from the EU in the form of subsidies etc., and how much will they contribute? The maximum of what a member state is asked to contribute is 1.2% of its gdp, resulting in large differences of what member states pay. Some states receive twice as much than they contribute, thanks to agriculture subsidies and regional aid. Others give much more than they receive. The table shows the eight candidate and potential candidate countries listing their GDP, unemployment percentage and percentage of the population living below the poverty line. The average GDP per capita in the current EU is €21.400, unemployment is 9.3% and 17% of the EU population lives below the poverty threshold or close to poverty. Corruption Much has been said about corruption in the Balkan countries since discussions about EU membership started. Corruption is often difficult to pin down and measure, but all reports show that it is a significant problem in the region. A 2011 report from the UNODC about corruption in the western Balkans shows that bribing government officials is a highly prevalent practice: eight out of ten people in the region come in contact with bribery each year. What is called ‘petty corruption’ is not as petty as it seems: the average bribe (two thirds in the form of cash, the other third in food, drink, or other) in the region is worth 257 eur-ppp. Though more than half of these bribes are paid because of an (in)direct request from a public official, in 43% of the cases they are offered by citizens without any coercion present. The Corruption Perceptions Index of 2010 ranks countries by their perceived level of public sector corruption from 0 to 10, 0 being highly corrupt and 10 very clean. By comparison, the Netherlands scored an 8.8, the UK a 7.6. Religion and ethnicity The Balkans have a large variety of ethnicities, languages and religious traditions, often unconnected to country borders. The largest part of the population is made up of Albanians, Greeks, Bulgarians, Macedonians, Romanians, Montenegrins, Serbs, and Bosnian Muslims. Vlachs and Roma are smaller, stateless groups. The main religions are Islam and Christianity. A large part of the tension in the area is due to different faiths – identity in the Balkans is often closely connected to religion rather than to language or even nationality. Whether religion is considered an important part of life differs per country but is quite high all across the area – according to a 2010 Gallup poll, 89% of people in Kosovo stated religion was an important part of their life, 76% of Macedonians, 60% of Bosnians, and 53% of Serbs. Likewise 68% of Croatians stated religion was important and 61% of Montenegrins. Albania had the lowest score with 44%. EU membership  While the governments of the (potential) candidates want to join the EU, not all citizens are equally eager. A Gallup report shows that there are quite some differences among the populations, dependent on ethnic background and country. The strongest identification with Europe is among the Albanians in Kosovo, with 72%. In Albania itself it is 50%, in Macedonia (with a lot of Albanians) it is 49%. The lowest support we find among the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina: 10%, and Kosovo, 15%. 21% of The Bosniaks in Bosnia and Herzegovina identify with Europe. All others are between 23% and 29%. However, the majority of the populations in the countries, save for Croatia and recently Bosnia and Herzegovina, is of the opinion that EU membership would be a good thing.   Heeft dit artikel uw interesse gewekt? Klik hier voor meer info en abonnementen. — Dit artikel verscheen in idee nr. 6 2011: The rule of law en is te vinden bij het onderwerp feiten & cijfers. Lees hier het pdf van dit artikel. Long ago, when I was in primary school, every year the same missionary honoured us with a visit. His remarkable appearance – bare feet in sandals, long beard, wearing a white habit with a coarse rope around his waist – never failed to impress his young audience. And so did his stories. He told us about black people in foreign countries who suffered from terrible diseases, were hungry and naked and above all deeply grateful for his merciful work. We children diligently saved up bottle caps that contained aluminium and could be sold to buy food and clothing for the poor. In my childish imagination it was a good cause to feed the hungry, so they wouldn’t have to eat each other anymore. Apparently I had heard about cannibals. To clothe the naked was a different story; I felt deeply sorry for the poor bastards who, due to my bottle caps, had to wear pants and skirts. My school was Roman- Catholic and the dress code was strict. Girls were not allowed to wear just pants. Over it, you had to wear a skirt too. I hated the two waistbands and envied primitive peoples for their nakedness. In my adolescent years I no longer believed in faith. My rebellion against church rules was caused by their fussy interference with my way of life and in particular to their smug pedantry. I embraced the assumptions of humanism, as I still do. Self-determination, personal freedom, empowerment of people to live their lives the way they like. When I reached adulthood, D66 was founded just in time to fulfil my desire for community involvement. We demolished the compartmentalization of our Dutch society, reinforced the control of power and refused to take the morals of our time for granted. But above all we wanted to live in a country where both human rights and concern for the environment were self-evident. Nothing could jeopardize our individuality; the key-word was democracy. We believed in our ability to change the world. Today, sadder and wiser, I realise that real change has to take a thorny path. I vividly remember my struggle to free myself from the religion of my upbringing. I had nightmares about having become a leper. The nuns had effectively planted the conviction in my subconscious that misbelievers were not only hungry and naked, but so terribly ill as well that only God could save them. Even during pregnancy I hesitated, for a brief moment, about baptizing our child-to-be. The European Prime Ministers hesitate too. Unfortunately not only for a brief moment. Forty-five years of concurrency are not enough to internalize the awareness of mutual dependency. When things get tough, the Pavlovian response in all national parliaments is the same: let’s do it without them or get rid of them. But we all agree that candidate states have to change and they have to do it at the earliest. My own liberal democrats are adding the extra mile for them with their demands for the quality of their democracy. I hesitate. Why not rely on the strengths of people?   Marijke Mous   Heeft dit artikel uw interesse gewekt? Klik hier voor meer info en abonnementen. — Dit artikel verscheen in idee nr. 6 2011: The rule of law en is te vinden bij het onderwerp religie.